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SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PRIVATE
TRUST IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
JOSEPH A. ROSENBERG*
"The problem is that the Legislature throughout the century has haphazardly
enacted a series of statutes, couched in general terms, which were intended to
carry out shifting or evolving concepts of social need. Older statutes based on
policies dimly stated, unstated or later greatly modified, perhaps even abandoned,
have been re-enacted and left to stand beside more recent enactments based on
new, and apparently conflicting notions of social justice, some in fact imported
from Federal law. Courts seeking a precise solution to a particular problem have
been utterly frustrated in their efforts to discover an integrated or workable
statutory scheme or a paramount legislative concern which would provide
consistent guidance through the maze. ",
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1924 Martin Escher executed a will for the purpose of distributing his prop-
erty equally to his five children.2 He knew that his daughter Marie suffered from
severe psychiatric problems, so Escher placed her share of the property in trust un-
til she reached the age of 30.' Eight years later, Escher executed an addendum to
his will that extended Marie's trust for her entire life. Escher died in 1937; Marie
began living at the Rockland Psychiatric Center in 1947, and she was formally ad-
judicated an "incompetent" on July 24, 1956. 4
* Assistant Professor, City University of New York School of Law; B.S. 1980, Northwestern
University; J.D. 1986, City University of New York School of Law. Special thanks to:
Grace Colson, Esq. for her able research assistance; Steven Godeski, who provided editorial
support, feedback, and other valuable assistance; and Stephen Loffredo and Vanessa Merton
for their time, creative ideas, and superb editing.
1 Baker v. Sterling, 39 N.Y.2d 397, 406, 348 N.E.2d 584, 590-91 (1976).
2 In re Escher, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. Bronx Co. 1978), ajfd, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1008
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 420 N.E.2d 91 (1981). Escher is the seminal case in New
York which established the right of a parent to create a discretionary trust for a disabled
adult child without jeopardizing the child's financial eligibility for government benefits
which are "means-tested."
3 Id. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
4 The term "incompetent" is a vestige of an earlier era and modem guardianship statutes
replaced the term with "incapacitated" to describe the person for whom a guardian is ap-
pointed.
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In 1978, 54 years after Martin signed his will, 46 years after the codicil, and 41
years after his death, a court in Bronx County, New York denied the government's
demand to be reimbursed for the cost of Marie's care during her institutionalized
years. The Escher decision is noteworthy because it articulated a public policy
based on the following: 1) traditional principles of trust analysis; 2) the socioeco-
nomic reality of the Great Depression; 3) an entitlement theory of government
benefits; and 4) society's evolving attitudes about the costs, stigmas, and realities
of long-term care.5 The convergence of these elements created a compelling narra-
tive about society, the law, and a parent's plan for a disabled child.
The court found that Martin Escher did not intend the trust's principal to be used
to pay for his daughter's government-provided medical care. The trust directed that
the principal only be used in the event of an "[I]llness, accident, or other emer-
gency,"6 which protected it from the government's claim for reimbursement for the
costs of Marie's care. The Escher trust was thus a primitive conceptual blueprint
for what is now commonly referred to as a "supplemental needs trust" ("SNT").
7
The gradual acceptance of third-party trusts designed to supplement government
benefits resolved a major dilemma faced by parents (and other relatives or friends)
who wanted to plan for the future care of a disabled loved one, without jeopardiz-
ing that person's eligibility for government benefits. However, these cases did not
address the problem that arises when a Medicaid recipient receives a lump sum of
money from a personal injury case, an inheritance, or another source.
Jean Williams was born in 1985 with multiple physical and neurological dis-
abilities.8 Jean is confined to a wheelchair and depends on adults for all activities.
Jean's cognitive and intellectual development will be severely limited throughout
her lifetime. Jean's parents brought a product liability action against several drug
companies that manufactured the drug they believe caused Jean's disabilities while
she was in utero. Because of problems in proving the various defendants' liability,
the total amount of the individual settlements was $140,000, a relatively small sum
in relation to Jean's actual damages and future needs. The settlement order blocked
use of the funds until Jean reached age eighteen.
Jean receives Medicaid services through a program designed to prevent the in-
stitutionalization of severely disabled children.9 As part of the Omnibus Budget
5 At the time of the decision, Marie Escher was 77 years old, confined to a wheelchair,
incontinent, totally dependent, and destined to live out the remainder of her life at the Rock-
land Psychiatric Center. Escher, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 108.6 Id. at 108.
7 This article defines the term "supplemental needs trust" broadly to include trusts de-
signed to provide for a beneficiary without jeopardizing the beneficiary's eligibility for gov-
ernment benefits. These trusts are also referred to as "special needs trusts," State Medicaid
Manual, Part 3-Eligibility, MCFA Transmittal No. 64 § 3259.7(A) (Nov. 1994), or "supple-
mental care trusts" Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Third-Party and Self-Created Trusts 24 (2d ed.
1998).
8 Jean Williams is a pseudonym. The facts and circumstances of her unreported case have
been modified to protect confidentiality.
9 This program provides Medicaid coverage to disabled minors in order to furnish home
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Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA '93"),"O Congress passed legislation allowing
people in Jean's situation to protect their "excess" assets in a trust that would not be
considered in determining Medicaid eligibility." Thus, when Jean turns eighteen,
the cost of her care will not rapidly deplete the settlement proceeds. The funds
could be placed in an OBRA '93 supplemental needs trust and used for Jean's
benefit during the course of her lifetime. 2
Unfortunately, the hope of protecting Jean's settlement proved to be short-lived.
Subsequent to the OBRA '93 legislation, a number of cases in a variety of jurisdic-
tions held that a Medicaid agency has the right to satisfy an existing Medicaid lien
against the proceeds of a personal injury lawsuit before the money is transferred
into a supplemental needs trust. 3 As a result, when Jean turns eighteen in 2003, the
settlement money will be subject to a Medicaid lien that will probably exceed the
amount of the settlement. Jean will receive no benefit from the lawsuit, and the
money intended to compensate her personal injuries will disappear into the state's
budget. Despite progress in the law governing trusts for people with disabilities,
Jean's case demonstrates that the struggle is not over.
The primary purpose of an SNT in both Escher and Jean Williams-type circum-
stances is to prevent costs and expenses related to health care and daily living that
would otherwise be covered by means-tested government benefit programs from
consuming assets. 14 An SNT benefits a person with a disability 5 who usually re-
care. Eligibility is based on the child's disability, without regard to the income and assets of
the parents. In Jean Williams' case, the program pays for a variety of goods and services,
including respite child care, modifications to her home to allow wheelchair access, a special
stroller, medical treatment, dental treatment, physical therapy, and orthotics.
10 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) et
seq.
1 The provisions authorizing trusts for people with disabilities are codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(4)(A) & (C) (1993). See infra Part III C.
12 See infra Part III C.
13 See infra Part IV B.
14 In this context, the term "government benefits" refers primarily to Supplemental Secu-
rity Income (SSI) and Medicaid, both of which have financial eligibility requirements. The
SSI program is Title XVI of the Social Security Act and became effective on January 1,
1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1972) et seq. SSI replaced a cluster of grant-in-aid federal and
state joint programs that provided income support for the aged, blind, and disabled who were
not eligible for Social Security Retirement or Disability Insurance Benefits. JOHN J. REGAN
ET AL., TAX, ESTATE, AND FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY § 8.02[1], at 8-6 & n.1
(2000). These programs included Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), and
Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD). Id.
Medicaid is Title XIX of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 el seq. Medicaid
is a medical assistance program for certain categories of financially eligible people, includ-
ing individuals and families who receive cash public assistance, the disabled, and the elderly.
REGAN, supra § 10.02, at 10-9. People with disabilities and the elderly may also or other-
wise be eligible for benefits under the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
and Medicare programs administered by the Social Security Administration. The OASDI
programs are Title II of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The Medicare
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lies on Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") for basic income support and Medi-
caid for a significant amount of health care coverage. The SNT is an emerging tool
that mitigates the inadequacies of government benefit programs for people with
disabilities. 6 The SNT is designed to enhance the beneficiary's quality of life
program is Title XVIII of the Social Security Act and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.
These social insurance benefit programs do not have financial criteria for eligibility, but de-
termine eligibility based on the insured's earnings record, age, and disability. In contrast,
means-tested government benefits carefully scrutinize the finances of an applicant and any
excess income or assets will render the person ineligible. Every Western industrial democ-
racy provides medical insurance universally on a social insurance model, except the United
States, which only extends public health insurance to the poor, elderly, disabled, and veter-
ans. THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 45 (1990).
Medicare provides health insurance to 39 million people who are either elderly or disabled.
See www.Medicare.gov. Medicare is extremely limited in the scope of its coverage for
home care, nursing home care, services related to the treatment and rehabilitation of chronic
medical conditions; also, Medicare does not cover prescription drugs. See, generally, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc; 42 C.F.R. Parts 405489; REGAN, supra, §§ 9.09- 9.16. Medicaid
is the only government program that provides coverage for long term care and related serv-
ices. See http//www.hcfa.gov/Medicaid. However, Medicaid requires a person to become
impoverished in order to access the program's services that are not available elsewhere. For
a discussion of the development of this structure of social welfare see Peter B. Edelman, To-
ward A Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J.
1697 (1993). Professor Edelman discusses how various groups have taken their place among
the "deserving" poor, including the blind, deaf, and insane in the nineteenth century, the eld-
erly after the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, disabled workers in 1956, and the
working poor with the passage of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1975.
15 The term disability generally includes a continuum of conditions that include, but are
not limited to, physical disabilities, developmental disabilities, mental retardation, traumatic
brain injuries and neurological impairments associated with age, such as Alzheimer's Dis-
ease. The precise definition of disability varies according to the context. With respect to
supplemental needs trusts, if the trust is a third-party trust established and funded by a parent
(or other person), the controlling definition will be found either in the particular state's stat-
ute authorizing the trust or in the eligibility criteria for the government benefit program. See,
e.g., WIs. STAT. § 701.06(5m) (1999)(defining a disabled individual as a person "who has a
disability which has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely, substantially im-
pairs the individual from adequately providing for his or her own care or custody, and con-
stitutes a substantial handicap to the afflicted individual .. "). If the trust is funded by the
disabled beneficiary and established pursuant to OBRA '93, the beneficiary must meet the
rather strict definition of disability under the Social Security Act. "[A]n individual shall be
considered to be disabled for purposes of this title if he is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
16 Our system of care does not adequately meet the needs of people with disabilities and
the elderly because it is premised almost exclusively on a medical model oriented toward
acute care. Problems with the medical model of health care include its failure to recognize
the importance of, and provide coverage for, preventive care, "nontraditional" forms of
health care, and a broader array of delivery models (i.e., home based care, day care, visiting
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through the purchase of additional goods and services that are not covered or ade-
quately provided by SSI and Medicaid. Periodic budget cutbacks, rationing of
services, pre-set levels of provider reimbursement, and prior approval requirements
have increased the need for supplemental goods and services that may be vital for
the well-being of a person with a disability. An SNT is used primarily in two cir-
cumstances: 1) as part of a parent'sestate planning for a child with a disability;17
and 2) when a disabled person receives a "lump sum" of money from a lawsuit, in-
heritance, or other source.
There have been significant differences in the law's treatment of "third-party
trusts" (funded by a parent or another "third party") in comparison to "self-settled"
trusts (funded with assets owned by the beneficiary)." Prior to court and govern-
ment agency acceptance of third-party SNTs, a parent had to exclude a disabled
child from an estate plan in order to avoid disqualifying the child from Medicaid
eligibility. 9 Until OBRA '93 authorized trusts funded with a disabled Medicaid
recipient's assets, the receipt of a "lump sum" of money would render the person
financially ineligible for Medicaid due to "excess resources."2
An SNT gives a person with a disability increased economic power to purchase
goods and services that enhance his or her quality of life. For example, a disabled
person can use an SNT to provide additional health care services and equipment,2
nurses, and physical therapy).
17 This kind of SNT can be established by a parent, other relative, friend, or any other
"third party" who is not legaliy responsible for the beneficiary under the relevant state law.
In this context, the third party is not legally responsible for the support, including medical
care, of the beneficiary of the trust. Federal Medicaid law defines a third party as one who is
legally responsible for paying the medical expenses of the Medicaid recipient. 42 C.F.R. §
433.136 (1985). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (mandating that States seek reim-
bursement from responsible third parties). For a discussion of Medicaid liens and responsi-
ble third parties see infra Part IV.
"g See infra, Part II.
19 Although supplemental needs trusts are used to transfer wealth "down" from one gen-
eration to another, they can also be used in most states to provide for an elderly parent, rela-
tive, or friend who is receiving government benefits.
20 The federal Medicaid statute and regulations establish the criteria and methodology for
a state's resource standard. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(I); 42 C.F.R. § 435.840. The pre-
cise resource limit varies among the states. For example, in 2000, an individual Medicaid
recipient in New York State is permitted to have $3,660 in liquid assets. N.Y. Soc. SERV. §
366(2)(a)(4)(West 2000). Some assets are exempt from being counted for eligibility pur-
poses, including a burial account and primary residence.
21 The most sophisticated assistive technology is usually not available under the Medicare
or Medicaid programs. See BRUCE C. VLADEK ET AL., Confronting the Ambivalence of Dis-
ability Policy: Has Push Come to Shove?, in DISABILITY: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL
INSURANCE, HEALTH CARE FINANCING & LABOR MARKET POLICY 83, 94 (Virginia P. Reno et
al. eds., 1997). See also, e.g., Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998) (bracing sys-
tems for severe musculoskeletal problems classified under Medicare as braces rather than
durable medical equipment, and thus not reimbursable in hospital and institutional settings);
DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (Medicaid limitations on coverage of"dura-
2000]
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specialized or unique therapy," private health insurance," educational and voca-
tional training, computers and software,24 case management services, and recrea-
tional activities.2" Moreover, the SNT may facilitate independent living in the
community by subsidizing the rental or purchase of a residence.26
This Article examines the development of supplemental needs trusts and their
role in meeting those needs of people with disabilities which are not adequately met
by government benefit programs. SNTs create a complementary partnership be-
ble medical equipment" upheld based on distinction between equipment primarily medical in
nature and devices employed for nonmedical purposes which might incidentally benefit
someone with a particular condition). This is a prime example of an area where an SNT can
fill in the gaps in Medicare and Medicaid coverage.
22 The limits of the medical model of treatment and services have created the push for
outcomes that focus on functionality and an assessment of what services and goods are nec-
essary to treat the whole person, rather than the narrowly defined medical condition. Nota-
bly there is often a more subjective functional benefit from assistive technology rather than a
medical benefit. VLADEK ET AL., supra Note, 21 at 95-96.
23 Id. For a discussion of how the structures of health care plans operate to exclude the
chronically ill, see STANLEY B. JONES, Why Not the Best for the Chronically Ill?, in
DISABILITY: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE, HEALTH CARE FINANCING & LABOR
MARKET POLICY 101, 101-1 12 (Virginia P. Reno et al. eds., 1997).
24 Assistive equipment such as computer keyboards, screens, and other devices that
maintain health or prevent disease, improve a person's functional limitations, or serve a vo-
cational purpose are generally not covered by either private insurance, Medicaid, or Medi-
care. VLADEK ET AL, supra note 21.
25 These examples do not exhaust the potential uses of an SNT. The SNT enables a bene-
ficiary to utilize health care providers who do not accept Medicaid or whose services are not
covered by Medicaid. The potential therefore exists for SNTs to reduce the utilization of
Medicaid providers by beneficiaries who pay for their health related services through the
SNT.
26 The SNT can be a powerful tool for creating alternative living arrangements for people
with disabilities by subsidizing rent, providing a down payment to purchase a house and as-
sisting with mortgage payments. People with disabilities who are unable to live independ-
ently, particularly those with mental illness or developmental disabilities, may otherwise
face a long waiting list for individual community residence "group homes." Often the per-
son with a disability either lives in an institution that is inappropriate or at home with parents
who are aging and increasingly unable to provide the necessary care. See Betty Booker,
Aging Parents Worry About Fate of Disabled Middle-Aged Children, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH (Sept. 25, 2000), available at www.timesdispatch.com; Juliana Gittler, For Your
Children, It's a Matter of Trust: Couple Wanted to Provide a Safe, Financially Secure Envi-
ronment for Their Disabled Son, THE POST-STANDARD, Syracuse, NY, May 29, 2000, at 5,
available at 2000 WL 5838476; Susan Garland, When Your Kids Will Always Be Dependent:
How to Assure Care for Disabled Children, BUSINESS WEEK, April 10, 2000, at 233, avail-
able at WL 7825654; Sue McDonald, Plan for Disabled Adults, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
April 21, 1999, at EOI, available at 1999 WL 9432807; Andree Brooks, Special Fund for




tween government benefits and private wealth." They promote a higher level of
support and care to the beneficiary of the trust than is available from government
benefits alone. An aging society, the prevalence of functional disabilities, and the
structure and limitations of the health insurance system in the United States have
made the supplemental needs trust an important tool.
People with disabilities are diverse in the nature and origins of their disabilities,
their unique special needs, and even the extent to which they rely on government
benefits.2" The social construct of disability is changing, and there are greater
numbers of people with a wider variety of disabilities.29 "[D]isability is a socially
27 Supplemental needs trusts are usually funded with relatively modest amounts of money
and are probably most often in the range of $10,000-$150,000. See, e.g., Santiago v.
Craigbrand Realty Corp., 706 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2000) ($140,000 personal injury set-
tlement less $12,857.06 Medicaid lien); In re Patrick BB, 700 N.Y.S.2d 301 (3d Dept. 1999)
($14,899.37 from inheritance after funding of Medicaid burial fund and resource allowance);
S.S. v. Utah, 972 P.2d 439 (1998) ($130,545.42 after payment of $44,454.58 Medicaid lien);
Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, (1998) ($42,000 after payment of $43,000
Medicaid lien); Norwest Bank of North Dakota, N.A. v. Doth, 159 F.3d 328 (8th Cir. 1998)
(in companion cases, $38,000 after payment of $72,000 Medicaid lien and $84,000 after
payment of $56,000 Medicaid lien); Guardianship and Conservatorship of Watkins, 947
P.2d 45 (Kan. App. 1997) ($28,000 inheritance); Hecker v. Stark County Social Service Bd.,
527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994) ($81,000 in trust created by parent of person with develop-
mental disability); Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services, 179 Conn. 83, 425 A.2d 553
(Conn. 1979) ($9,515 in trust created by parent of disabled daughters); cf Department of
Social Services v. Saunders, 724 A.2d 1093 (Conn. 1999) ($579,824.02 net settlement).
28 People with very severe disabilities are often wholly dependent on Medicaid, which
covers the cost of care and services in residential facilities. However, many people with dis-
abilities reside in the community, are covered by private insurance and/or Medicare and do
not incur substantial Medicaid bills. The community of people with disabilities is not
monolithic and the need for an SNT depends on the extent to which a person may need
Medicaid coverage or the extent of any cognitive impairment. If Medicaid is a part of the
person's health insurance, the SNT is essential to protect what would otherwise be consid-
ered "excess" assets. Even if the person is not currently eligible for Medicaid, it is probably
beneficial to utilize an SNT "just in case." If the person with a disability has a cognitive im-
pairment that affects her ability to manage property, the use of an SNT is prudent unless
there are enough funds to pay the costs of any foreseeable health care needs.
29 Social Security Administration actuaries predicted an 88% increase in disabled workers
receiving Disability Insurance Benefits from 1995-2010. See R. ALEXANDER VACHON, Dis-
ability Policy in an Age of Reform, in CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING & LABOR MARKET POLICY, supra note 21, at 118, 119. People with disabilities
can be grouped into the following broad categories: i) adults with severe, often life-
threatening, medical conditions such as cancer, HIV, respiratory, lupus, emphysema, multi-
ple sclerosis, and heart disease; 2) adults with musculoskeletal impairments, typically back
problems, and chronic pain; 3) adults with mental disorders, including cognitive impairments
and mental illness (e.g., clinical depression and schizophrenia); 4) young adults age 18-25
with mental retardation, head and other injuries from accidents; and 5) children with devel-
opmental disabilities, physical disabilities, and learning disabilities. See JERRY MASHAW,
Findings of the Disability Policy Panel, in CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE, HEALTH
2000]
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and economically crosscutting phenomenon" in which income support and medical
care are only components of a larger picture that also includes housing, personal
assistance, educational and vocational services, and rehabilitation." The SNT
plays a crucial role in this "larger picture" that is part of a "future care plan" devel-
oped with and for the person with a disability.
Throughout its history, the trust has furthered social justice by providing for the
needs of people who are subject to the harsh dictates of the law. The supplemental
needs trust emerged from a mix of judicial and legislative developments and
broader societal changes. The intermingling of trust law and eligibility criteria for
means-tested government benefit programs created the concept of supplemental
needs trusts.
Public policy toward people with disabilities has moved away from an institu-
tional model and has moved toward community-based living and support services
that emphasize independent living and maximizing employment potential. The
demographics of an aging society created a sense of urgency to address the needs of
two groups: 1) a generation of aging parents facing their own mortality, who cared
for their disabled child through adulthood; and 2) an increasing number of adults
with disabilities who are integrated into the community.
Part I of this Article discusses the historical antecedents of the supplemental
needs trust in feudal England and the United States. In feudal England the "use"
emerged as a tool for social justice by evading the harsh dictates of feudal law that
disadvantaged women, daughters, younger sons, and religious orders. In American
jurisprudence, centuries-long interplay among innovations in the form of trusts,
legislation designed to regulate trusts, and judicial interpretation of trusts within the
context of law and public policy shaped the trust.
Part II discusses three significant stages of SNT development in the United
States: 1) the common-law treatment of third-party trusts; 2) the enactment of SNT
statutes by state legislatures; and 3) the groundbreaking provisions of the federal
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which authorized the use of individ-
ual and pooled trusts funded with "lump sums" received by a person with a disabil-
ity.
Part III analyzes and critiques cases decided after the enactment of trust provi-
sions of OBRA '93 holding that a Medicaid agency has the right to satisfy a lien
against the proceeds of a personal injury lawsuit prior to the funding of a supple-
CARE FINANCING & LABOR MARKET POLICY, supra, at 22-23. From 1989 to 1995 the num-
ber of children receiving SSI more than tripled to 927,000, and the cost increased from 1.1
billion to $5 billion. VACHON, supra at 122. See also, Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521
(1990) (holding that Social Security regulations violated Social Security Act in that children
with disabilities of comparable severity to adults were denied benefits under Supplemental
Security Income Program). The Zebley decision resulted in reassessments of eligibility and
numerous retroactive awards of benefits. To accommodate these lump sums without jeop-
ardizing the recipient's eligibility for SSI, the Social Security Administration approved the
use of supplemental needs trusts. These so-called "Zebley trusts" foreshadowed the trust
provisions in the OBRA '93 legislation.
30 VLADEK, supra note 21, at 89.
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mental needs trust. If the size of the Medicaid lien is significant in relation to the
settlement or award, and the lien can be satisfied prior to the funding of the trust,
the protections created by OBRA '93 are sabotaged. This Article argues that these
decisions misinterpret the federal statutes governing Medicaid liens and undermine
a primary purpose of the OBRA '93 legislation.
Part IV explores the rationale of public policy toward supplemental needs trusts
by responding to a critique that SNTs merely waste scarce resources by providing
SSI and Medicaid to people who are not truly indigent. This Article then suggests
a number of proposals for reforming the law governing SNTs and also proposes
using the SNT model to expand the trend toward enhanced resource allowances,
trusts, and earmarked funds. These proposals aim to do the following: 1) make
SNTs more accessible and efficient; 2) eliminate the continued existence of varia-
tion and uncertainty in judicial analysis of third-party trusts for a beneficiary who is
disabled and who receives government benefits; 3) strengthen the disability trust
provisions under OBRA '93; and 4) use the SNT model to narrow the differences
between means-tested government benefits and social insurance programs.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST
A. A Snapshot of Trusts in Feudal England
For centuries, the trust has proven to be a durable, flexible, and effective struc-
ture for managing property in England and the United States." The development of
the trust has been extolled as the "most distinctive achievement of English law-
yers."32 The dominant theory underlying the concept of a trust is grounded in prop-
erty law. Its defining feature is a bifurcated ownership structure in which property
is transferred to a trustee who manages it for a beneficiary.33 A trust differs from
the "outright" ownership of property in that the trustee, the recipient of the transfer,
is considered the "legal" owner and the beneficiary has an "equitable" interest. The
trustee controls the property, but the beneficiary can enforce the terms of the trust
instrument, which provide directions to the trustee as to how the trust should be
administered.
The triangular relationship among creator, trustee, and beneficiary has also been
explained as an essentially contractual relationship based on the "trust deal. 34 Re-
3 The trust is most prevalent in common law legal systems based on the English model,
and is generally not found in European civil law countries. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo
Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 434 (1998). Compare Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern Trust Re-
vistsed, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1139 (1996) (proposing that the Islamic "waqf' was the primary
model for the original development of the trust in England).
32 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 23 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984).
33 Id. at 44.
34 See, e.g., John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
2000]
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gardless of whether one categorizes the trust under the rubric of property law or
contract law, its form, function, and substance are adaptable and flexible. The
trust's distinctive structure has forged new paths between existing legal doctrine
across the span of centuries in England and the United States.
The trust began as a tool to transfer land, which was the primary form of wealth
in feudal England. The "use"35 was the original term that described an arrangement
whereby a landowner conveyed his land to his friends (the trustees36 ) "for the use"
of the landowner's children. The use proved to be a powerful force that subverted
the burdens imposed by the King on landowners in a feudal system. "
The earliest instance of the use occurred in the first half of the thirteenth
century when landowners employed the use for the benefit of the Franciscan fri-
ars.3 The rules of their order required the friars to take complete vows of poverty
so that they would be dependent on the people whom they served.39 Friars could
not own any property, either individually or collectively." In order to provide
housing for the friars in the towns to which they traveled as missionaries, a land-
owner would convey it to the "borough" for the friars' use.4' Thus, the friars were
able to enjoy the benefits of using land without violating their vows of poverty.42
The modem trust developed as a result of the "more or less accidental circum-
625, 632-33 (1995) (identifying three particularly resented landholding rules: 1) the feudal
landholding rules mandating that land pass by descent and prohibiting land from being con-
veyed by will; 2) the shares of primogeniture and dower; and 3) financial penalties on trans-
fers of land to minors called "wardship and marriage.").
35 According to Professor Maitland, "use" derives from the vulgar Latin "ad opus"
meaning "on his behalf'. MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 24. "In Old French [ad opus] be-
came 'al oes, ues'. In English mouths this becomes confused with 'use'." Id.
36 In feudal England, the trustee was referred to as a "feofee"--for ease of reference I use
the term trustee throughout.
37 See Austin Wakeman Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, XXXI YALE
L.J.1 457 (Mar. 1922).
38 See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 9 (1960);
MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 25.
39 MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 25.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Although different in significant ways, the use's application for the benefit of the friars
loosely foreshadowed the modem day supplemental needs trust. In order to qualify for
means-tested government benefits, a person who is deemed deserving (i.e., categorically eli-
gible) must take a "vow of poverty." If a deserving person is eligible for government bene-
fits, but owns even a modest amount of assets, the government requires that the property be
relinquished in order for the owner to qualify. To avoid the harshness of these rules, the
SNT provides some of the benefits of private wealth to people who are forced into poverty
because they are unable to cure it through employment due to disability or age. Perhaps the
use as it was applied for the friars has a more direct relationship with the modem day chari-
table trust, but the role of the use in alleviating the Franciscans' vow of poverty invites the
comparison with a supplemental needs trust. The comparison also reminds us that, despite
their vulnerability, people with disabilities often help us re-frame our perspective on life and
inspire us through their struggles.
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stance that beginning in fifteenth-century England, there were separate courts of
law and equity."4 Until the fifteenth century, the use was not legally enforceable,
but was treated as a "gentleman's agreement." The rigid application of the law by
the common law courts created injustice, and petitioners looked to the King's Court
and Council. These cases were referred to the chancellor and the Court of Chan-
cery was established around 1422." From the fifteenth century onward, the use be-
came subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of equity, which employed
procedures and remedies that were better suited to enforcing the use than the rigid
approach of the King's Court or common law courts.45
Although the Chancellor initially enforced the personal duties of the trustee
through an appeal to conscience, over time a "system of equitable ownership" was
created."' In the eyes of the Chancellor, the trust did not violate public policy. In
contrast, the common law judges were preoccupied with categories of property
ownership that caused them to rule that the purposes of the use violated "the policy
of the law."47
The use became extremely popular as an effective way to avoid the burdens of an
increasingly obsolete feudal system. 48 A fundamental pillar of feudal policy was
the prohibition against devising land by will on the theory that the eldest son was
best suited to take over from the tenant upon his father's death.49 Because the for-
mal legal rules that governed estates did not bind equity, land could be transferred
for the benefit of younger sons and daughters despite feudal decrees and restric-
tions."0 During this time, the use enabled tenants to defeat the multiple and burden-
43 The Judicare Acts of 1873 and 1875 reunited the courts under the "High Court of Jus-
tice." MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 15.
44 ScoTT, supra note 38, at 8. Originally Parliament and the King's Council were the
only available alternatives. The Council referred these cases to the chancellor, who in the
early years was an ecclesiastic and not a lawyer. Their domain was conscience, not law.
Beginning in 1529, lawyers have reigned in the Court of Chancery and shaped it into a sys-
tem of law. Id.
45 The equity courts could enforce specific performance by the trustee, which enabled the
beneficiary to receive the "ancestral land," rather than mere money damages. In addition,
the Chancery court obtained testimony under oath, unlike the common law courts. See
Langbein, supra note 34, at 634-35.
46 MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 5. The chancellor was concerned with equity to remedy
the injustice of the law. For a discussion of the origins of equity and the role of the chan-
cellor, see PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 7-29 (1990). The new form of
property ownership represented by the trust evolved under the guise of an appeal to the trus-
tee's conscience in order to enforce the trustee's personal duties. Id. As it developed, the
beneficiary's equitable interest shared some characteristics with a legal interest. For exam-
ple, if the beneficiary of the trust died without a will, his interest in the trust passed to heirs.
47 SCOTT, supra note 38, at 11.
48 MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 7.
49 This was the system of primogeniture, the English system of passing property to heirs.
50 SCOTT, supra note 38, at i1. Athough a landowner could not dispose of land in a will,
he could request that the trustees deal with land in a particular way. See MAITLAND, supra
note 32, at 27.
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some claims of the "overlords."'"
Married women utilized the trust to improve their economic positions by pre-
venting their husbands from controlling property inherited by them. On the other
hand, the trust could also prevent a wife from claiming "dower," her share of a de-
ceased husband's estate."
If a landowner wanted to allow a religious order to benefit from land, he could
employ a use and avoid the mortmain laws, which required forfeiture of land con-
veyed to religious or other corporations. 3
Despite the role of the use in distributing land to achieve these positive social
purposes, those who sought to avoid the claims of creditors sometimes abused the
use.54 A creditor seeking to enforce a judgment could not seize land that the land-
owner transferred to multiple trustees for the use of the landowner. In 1376, Par-
liament struck down the use as a "spendthrift" device to avoid creditors of the
transferor. 5
In 1536, the Statute of Uses was enacted by Parliament, allegedly as a response
to what was perceived to be the fraud and injustices perpetuated by the use. In re-
ality, the architect of the statute was Henry VIII, "the one man in the kingdom who
had everything to gain and nothing to lose by abolishing uses."56 Although the
Statute of Uses abolished the "passive" landholding use, it did not apply to the "ac-
tive" use that evolved into the modem-day trust. 7 The distinction between a pas-
sive use and an active use is often subtle. If the trust merely instructed the trustee
that the beneficiary was to enjoy the use of the land, the trust was converted to a
legal estate owned by the beneficiary and could not be transferred by will. 8 How-
51 Land would revert to the overlord if the tenant didn't have any natural heirs. If an heir
was an infant, the overlord was entitled to rents and profits until the infant became an adult.
The overlord also had the right to sell the privilege of marrying the heir, and was entitled to
"aids" when the tenant's eldest son was knighted and the eldest daughter married. Although
the "feofees" (trustees) had to pay their "dues" to the overlord, the use of multiple feofees as
joint tenants avoided the feudal incidents. See SCOTT, supra note 38, at 11. A use could also
evade the law of forfeiture for treason and escheat for felony. See MAITLAND, supra note 32,
at 27.
52 SCOTT, supra note 38, at 12.
53 MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 7. In 1391, the mortmain forfeiture rules, which man-
dated that land transferred to religious organizations or corporations be forfeited to the
overlord, were expanded to cover land conveyed to individuals for the use of those organi-
zations or corporations. Id.
54 SCOTT, supra note 38, at 10.
55 Id. During this time, there was enormous discontent in England among laborers, and
the poll tax, renewed by the Parliament of 1380, ignited revolt among peasants. See JOHN
RICHARD GREEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 251 (1911). Lawyers did not
fare well at the hands of the peasants. In Blackheath, they killed every lawyer they could lay
their hands on, shouting "[n]ot till all these were killed would the land enjoy its old freedom
again." Id. at 252.
56 MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 7.
57 See generally, id. at 34-39.
58 Id. at 38.
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ever, if the trust directed the trustee to collect rents and profits and pay them to the
beneficiary during his life, the trustee had active duties and the Statute of Uses did
not apply.A9
Together, these developments revolutionized the law of conveyancing in Eng-
land.6 As the feudal system dissolved in England, the trust changed from a land-
holding device to a means for actively managing financial assets.61 This evolution
continued in colonial America through the present time.62 Three aspects of the
trust's development in feudal England foreshadowed the modem evolution of the
supplemental needs trust in the United States: 1) it avoided rigid application of le-
gal doctrine; 2) it was used to alleviate the economic position of a beneficiary who
would otherwise be impoverished; and 3) the Court of Chancery used equitable
principles to go beyond technical legal rules that were no longer required by public
policy.
B. Origins and Development of Trusts in the United States
Some of the earliest known trust arrangements in colonial America appeared in
the seventeenth century. A physician in Maryland created a trust for his wife and
children to avoid liability for potential damages in a lawsuit.63 In a less formal ar-
rangement, a woman in Massachusetts entered into a verbal trust-like arrangement
with her future husband to provide for her children and prevent her husband from
controlling her property.'
At the end of the eighteenth century and into the mid-nineteenth century, south-
em slave owners created trusts in their wills as a way to emancipate slaves.65 These
trusts challenged chancellors in courts of equity to decide whether the intent of the
testator to free his slaves should be honored against the claims of descendants and
in violation of statutes that prohibited a person to manumit slaves.66 These "slave
suits" attracted national attention and embroiled public policy in turmoil.67 Typi-
cally, the trust directed the trustee to free the beneficiaries when the law permit-
ted.68 Thereafter, when the law was amended to allow manumission, the "next
" Id. at 39.
60 See SCOTT, supra note 38, at 4.
61 Langbein, supra note 34, at 636.
62 id.
63 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 63-64 (2d ed. 1985).
6Id.
65 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 112-19 (1990). These trusts were in
the form of express trusts in which the testator clearly stated his intent, implicit trusts that
required the chancellor to discern intent a bit, and so-called "secret trusts" in states that pro-
hibited testamentary trusts. Id. In addition, the equitable remedy of the constructive trust
was used to prevent the unjust enrichment of a person who attempted to appropriate the land
of freed slaves. Id. at 115 (citing Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246 (1858)).
6 Id. at 112.
67 Id. Among the public policy issues Chancellors had to decide was the question of
whether slaves had standing to petition and obtain relief.
68 Id. at 113 (describing the case of Pleasants v. Pleasants, 2 Call 319 (1799)). The Chan-
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friends" of the slaves could petition the chancellor.69 A favorable ruling in this
kind of case would order the beneficiaries' release from bondage and perhaps also
order that they be paid wages for the time they were not free.70 Despite significant
opposition and restrictions on the scope of the chancellor's discretion, "trusteeship
was a still, small voice for equality and testators heard it."'" Unfortunately, decrees
that refused to uphold equality far outnumbered the cases that recognized and en-
forced trusts established to free slaves.72
In the nineteenth century, the spendthrift trust continued as a way to provide for
vulnerable family members (including "married women, minors, incompetents"),
while preventing the beneficiaries and their creditors from reaching the trust as-
sets.73 It was not unusual for a parent to place property in trust for the benefit of a
daughter whose husband was "insolvent."74 If a son was a debtor, a parent could
give property to him as trustee, for the purpose of managing it for the benefit of his
children, with the right to be paid a reasonable income from the trust.75
Trusts were also established for the benefit of wealthy families, corporations, and
religious institutions. Families perpetuated their "dynasties" by utilizing trusts to
preserve wealth and hold land for generations. 6 The populace viewed dynastic
cellor who decided Pleasants was George Wythe, Thomas Jefferson's mentor.
69 Id.
70 This was the result in Pleasants, supra note 68. Hoffer describes how testators in North
Carolina and South Carolina used "secret trusts" after statutes were enacted prohibiting tes-
tamentary slave trusts. HOFFER, supra note 65, at 113.
71 Id. at 114. In South Carolina, Judge John Belton O'Neall permitted secret trusts and
exercised great lengths (and apparently tortured logic) to serve freedom, even after the leg-
islature eliminated the court on which he sat and passed statutes that extinguished any gifts
to slaves that "[a]nticipated their manumission." Id. at 115. Unfortunately, Judge O'Neall
rationalized his decisions by stating that the institution of slavery could only survive with a
"kindly spirit." Id. at 116.
72 Id. at 115-19.
73 Id. at 251-55. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1985).
74 HOFFER, supra note 65, at 251-52 (describing the arrangement Thomas Jefferson made
for his daughter).
75 Id. at 252. The purpose of giving the property to the son in his capacity as trustee, and
not outright to him individually, was to prevent his creditors from reaching the assets.
76 Id. at 240, 252-55. Friedman makes the point that wealthy individuals and families
have used the trust to preserve "dynastic" wealth despite the Rule Against Perpetuities,
which limits the duration of trusts that are not charitable to a period of approximately 100
years. A dynastic trust prevented the sale of land by current beneficiaries and prevented the
land's use as an article of commerce. The general rule purports to limit the length of time
property interests can be suspended without vesting in an individual to 21 years after the
death of a life in being upon the creation of the interest. In simple terms, if a person creates
a trust, and the measuring lives are the creator's children, the trust must vest full ownership
in a beneficiary within 21 years after the death of the last surviving child. The Rule Against
Perpetuities is infamous for its complexity and has been the subject of much scholarly analy-
sis. See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942); Jesse
Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1867 (1986).
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family trusts negatively because they supported the upper class and, by keeping
land out of commerce, clashed with emerging values of the market place." An-
other form of dynastic trust was the charitable trust, which held land and chattels
for the benefit of religious groups.78 Not surprisingly, the religious charitable trust
was also unpopular because it was "associated with privilege, with the dead hand,
with established churches, with massive wealth held in perpetuity."7 9 At the end of
the nineteenth century, the trust was used to purchase the stock of competing cor-
porations in order to create monopolies that choked competition. The Sherman Act
outlawed these types of trusts. The association of the trust with these dynastic and
monopolistic purposes tarnished the trust's image.
In twentieth-century America, use of the trust for an expanding variety of pur-
poses continued and, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, trusts will be
practically ubiquitous."0 In the private sphere they are used as estate planning de-
vices to minimize estate taxes, 81 as perpetuators of dynastic wealth,82 and as a way
to preserve assets against the improvidence of a beneficiary and his creditors. 3 The
largest growth of the trust has been in the area of commercial trusts, which have
become the dominant structure for the management of mutual funds, pensions, and
other assets that constitute a significant portion of personal and national wealth. 4
77 FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, at 253.
78 HOFFER, supra, note 65, at 128. Spendthrift and charitable trusts maintained the status
quo and conflicted with the rise of the entrepeneurship that began in the 1830s. In 1865,
President Johnson ordered the Freedman's Bureau to return land over which it had acted as
trustee for the benefit of slaves to the former owners. Hoffer analogizes the return of the
white landowners to a "repudiation of the trust." Id. At this historical juncture, Hoffer
points out that President Johnson argued the case for those who wanted to liberalize trust law
while the Radicals supported a more traditional view of trusts. Id.
79 Id. at 254.
80 See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Changes In The Role And The Form Of The Trust At The New
Millennium, Or, We Don't Have To Think Of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REv. 543
(1998).
81 The marital trust and credit shelter trusts are familiar terms of art for trusts that provide
for beneficiaries of trusts and minimize estate and gift taxes. The credit shelter trust effec-
tively doubles the size of an estate that is exempt from estate tax without depriving the in-
tended beneficiary (typically the surviving spouse) of the use of the property.
82 See generally, Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964).
83 This is commonly known as the "spendthrift trust," a source of much controversy and
commentary. See, e.g., JOHN CHPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION lx (2d ed. 1895);
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift
Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1
( 1995); Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB.
L. REv. 179 (1993). The spendthrift trust has been called a "close relative" of the supple-
mental needs trust. See Hirsch, supra at 82-83.
84 Within the 2 0 th century United States, charitable trusts and private trusts have been
dwarfed by the rise of the commercial trust. For a discussion of commercial trusts (e.g., pen-
sion trusts, investment trusts, and other forms of trust that are contractual exchanges in con-
trast to personal trusts which are funded by gratuitous transfers) and why, despite holding
90% of trust assets in the United States, they have been largely ignored by scholars and
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In the public domain, the role of the charitable trust"5 has increased with the emer-
gence of philanthropies as a positive force in American culture. The rise of the
charitable trust is also due in no small measure to the unlimited tax deductions and
exemptions which provide incentives for the wealthy to give to charities in order to
reduce their taxable income and avoid estate taxes.
II. A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDSTRUST WITH ITS CLOSEST
TRUST "RELATIVES"
The rise of the modem welfare state shaped the structure and role of trusts for
people with disabilities who qualified for government benefits. The name "sup-
plemental needs trust" refers to a form of private trust for the benefit of a disabled
beneficiary who receives means-tested government benefits. The trust is designed
so that it will not be considered an available resource under the eligibility rules for
Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid, the major means-tested benefit pro-
grams. Although a trustee is usually given a fair amount of discretion regarding
distributions, if the intent to supplement the beneficiary's government benefits is
explicit, the trust will not affect the beneficiary's eligibility for benefits.8 6
The SNT is part of a broader "family" of trusts that includes spendthrift trusts,
support trusts, and discretionary trusts. Although each form of trust is discussed
separately, their distinctive elements are often combined in a hybrid form of trust.
A. Spendthrift Trusts: Protecting Trust Assets from the Beneficiary and Creditors
A "classic" spendthrift trust is a "third-party" trust that provides income to (or
for the benefit of) a beneficiary. 7 If the trustee of a spendthrift trust is authorized
to distribute principal, a "disabling restraint" may prevent the beneficiary from as-
signing her right to principal.88 A "self-settled" 9 trust that attempts to avoid the
claims of the creator's creditors, including government agencies, is void as a matter
of public policy in most states.90 Most jurisdictions, however, allow a property do-
trusts and estates attorneys, see John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as
an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997).
85 Charitable trusts are governed by I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3)(West 2000).
86 See infra Part III.A.3.
87 The leading case recognizing a spendthrift provision restricting the alienation of a
beneficiary's income is Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882). This is
the case that provoked Professor John Chipman Gray's suggestion that judges who upheld
spendthrift provisions were motivated by paternalism, which Gray called the "[t]he funda-
mental essence alike of spendthrift trusts and of socialism." WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT
ON TRUSTS, 4th Ed. § 152 at 90 (quoting Gray, Restraints on Alienation lx (2d ed. 1895)).
88 FRATCHER, supra note 87 § 153, at 130.
89 A self-settled trust is a trust created and funded by a person for his own benefit.
90 FRATCHER, supra, note 87, § 156 at 164. See, e.g., N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts 7-3.1(a):
"A disposition in trust for the use of the creator is void as against the existing or subsequent
creditors of the creator." Alaska and Delaware are unique in that they have enacted "asset
protection" statutes that enable a person to create a self-settled trust that is insulated from
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nor to create a "third-party" trust for the benefit of another person who will not be
subject to claims of the beneficiary's creditors.91
A spendthrift trust prevents an irresponsible, indebted, or incapacitated benefici-
ary9" from assigning or alienating her right to the income. 3 Creditors of the benefi-
ciary are not able to attach the income of the trust. 9' The spendthrift trust has been
criticized for enabling a beneficiary to enjoy the benefits of personal wealth with no
accountability to creditors and dependents.95 To remedy this potential inequity,
some courts and legislatures have recognized exceptions for certain classes of
creditors and dependents: government agencies to collect taxes96 or reimbursement
for necessaries,97 tort plaintiffs,9" and dependent children. 99 Statutes may also allow
the principal of a spendthrift trust to be invaded if the income is not sufficient to
provide for the basic support of the beneficiary. 00
The question of fairness arises with regard to the third-party spendthrift trust, but
despite a variety of practical and theoretical critiques,' it has endured and gained
acceptance in virtually all jurisdictions in the United States.'0 2 Spendthrift provi-
sions are often incorporated into support and discretionary trusts as "extra protec-
tion." However, the structure of each of these trusts offers its own protection
against alienation by the beneficiary and the claims of creditors.
creditors. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie. 1998); DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 12 §§
3570-76 (1998).
91 See, e.g., Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (upholding re-
straint on alienation and reasoning that creditors are not defrauded because it is possible for
them to discover the restraint on alienation and also their position is no worse than if the
trust terminated the beneficiary's interest upon alienation); see also Nichols v. Eaton, 91
U.S. 716 (1875) (recognizing the right of a person to establish a discretionary trust that will
be immune from the beneficiary's creditors, and rejecting the position of the English Chan-
cery Court that a trust is available to satisfy a beneficiary's creditors regardless of the do-
nor's intent). A third-party trust is created and funded by a person for the benefit of another.
The English courts have not recognized spendthrift trusts, except if the beneficiary is a mar-
ried woman. FRATCHER, supra note 87 § 152, at 85.
92 These are the archetypal kinds of beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts.
93 For a complete discussion of restraints on voluntary and involuntary alienation of a
beneficiary's interest see FRATCHER, supra note 87 §§ 149-162, at 74-240.
94 Id.
95 John Chipman Gray argued vociferously against the spendthrift trust on the basis that it
was shocking to allow a person to enjoy wealth without responsibility by receiving income
without paying debts. Id.
96 Id. § 157.4, at210.
97 See, e.g., In re Lackmann's Estate, 320 P.2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
98 Id.
99 See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS at 156 (6th ed. 1987).
too See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS §7-1.6 (West 2000).
101 See supra note 83.
102 In contrast, the spendthrift trust has never been allowed in England. FRATCHER, supra
note 87 § 152, at 85-92.
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B. Support Trusts. A Basic Standard of Living (At Least)
A support trust typically directs the trustee to distribute the amount of income
and principal necessary to provide for the education and maintenance of the benefi-
ciary.1 °3 Because the trustee has a duty to use the trust for its intended purposes,
the beneficiary of a support trust does not have the power to assign his interest and
it is protected against creditors'O°
However, a trust that authorizes the general support of the beneficiary will gen-
erally result in a partial or total loss of eligibility for means-tested government
benefits because the income and principal will be considered available to the bene-
ficiary. "5
C. Discretionary Trusts: It's All Up to the Trustee
A "pure" discretionary trust gives the trustee complete discretion to decide when
and how to distribute income and principal or to withhold distributions com-
pletely.'1 6 The beneficiary of a discretionary trust does not have an enforceable in-
terest in the trust because the trustee is not required to distribute income or princi-
pal.'0 7  Creditors of the beneficiary also cannot force the trustee to make a
distribution.'0 8 However, a person cannot create a discretionary trust for his own
benefit in order to avoid the claims of creditors.')°A pure discretionary trust will
generally not be considered "available" to the beneficiary, unless the creator of the
trust intended to provide support to the beneficiary.' 0 The trustee's refusal to make
any distributions may be considered an abuse of discretion."'
D. Supplemental Needs Trusts: A Hybrid Form of Trust Intertwined with
Government Benefits
The supplemental needs trust is essentially a hybrid form of trust that contains
elements of a spendthrift, support, and discretionary trust. As a form of third-party
spendthrift trust, the beneficiary cannot assign his or her interest in the income or
principal and the trust is insulated from the claims of most of the beneficiary's
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959); BOGERT, supra note 99, at 162.
104 BOGERT, supra note 99, at 162.
1o5 See, e.g., Bennett v. Sawyer County, 357 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (compelling
trustee to make payments of principal for beneficiary's health care because trust authorized
support); McNiff v. Olmsted County Welfare Dep't, 176 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1970) (finding
trust intended to provide general, not supplemental, support).
106 BOGERT, supra note 99, at 160. See also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discre-
tion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1961).
107 BOGERT, supra note 99, at 160.
'08 Id. at 161.
'09 Id. at 162.
110 Id. at 161 n.4.
... Id. at 161. For a discussion of discretionary support trusts for beneficiaries receiving




The underlying theory of the supplemental needs trust, and the circumstances of
the disabled beneficiary, are qualitatively different from a typical spendthrift trust.
A classic depiction of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is one who is an irre-
sponsible and lazy heir of a wealthy family who gets enough income from the trust
to prevent destitution."' The assets of the spendthrift trust are protected from the
beneficiary's profligate spending and from the trail of creditors created by the bene-
ficiary's irresponsible ways." 4
In contrast, the beneficiary of a supplemental needs trust has a severe, often per-
manent, disability that prevents her from supporting herself adequately through
employment. The beneficiary of an SNT is usually one who is struggling through
life despite daunting odds, considerable physical and/or cognitive limitations, and
insufficient public support. The SNT is structured so that the beneficiary qualifies
for the widest array of government benefits including basic income support, medi-
cal care, and other basic needs.
The supplemental nature of the SNT distinguishes it from the kind of general
support that is most commonly associated with a support trust. Similarly, it is dif-
ferent from a pure discretionary trust. Although the trustee of the SNT has a large
area of discretion, the purposes of the trust are sufficiently specific to give the
beneficiary an arguable claim for a certain level of distributions.
III DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST
The modem supplemental needs trust emerged out of a synthesis of trust juris-
prudence, the financial eligibility criteria of means-tested government benefits for
people with disabilities, and the evolution of public policy. Three significant de-
velopmental stages mark the law's response to this new situation: 1) case law inter-
preting third-party trusts established for a beneficiary receiving government bene-
fits;" 5 2) state legislative action authorizing the use of third-party trusts as a
1' See infra Part III.A.
113 Hirsch, supra note 83; Mary Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance
for Twenty-First Century Planning, 50 THE RECORD 140 (Association of the Bar of the City
of New York 1995).
11 Although support and discretionary trusts are alternatives to a spendthrift trust in that
the scope of the beneficiary's enforceable interest is restricted, spendthrift provisions are
frequently incorporated into support and discretionary trusts. See Hirsch, supra note 84, for
a criticism of this practice. However, the analysis of third party SNT's frequently includes
an inquiry whether the trust is spendthrift. See infra Part III.A.
115 This discussion is limited to third-party trusts (i.e., a trust created by a person other
than the beneficiary), because in almost every state it is against public policy for a person to
establish a "self-settled" trust, fund it with her own assets, name herself as a beneficiary, and
protect those assets from creditors. A notable exception was created in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, which authorized trusts funded with assets received by a dis-
abled Medicaid recipient provided the trust complied with the requirements of the statute.
See infra Part III.C. Public policy toward self-settled trusts is reflected in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156:
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supplement to government benefits; and 3) the passage of the federal Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which authorized a disabled person to transfer
assets into a trust without jeopardizing his or her eligibility for Medicaid.
A. Courts Analyze Trust Language, Statutes, and Public Policy to Determine the
Availability of Third-Party Trusts
The validity of third-party trusts established and funded by parents (and other
third parties) to protect disabled beneficiaries depends, to a large extent, on the law
in a particular state. The context of these cases usually involves a government
agency's claim that the trust assets should be considered available, either to reim-
burse the agency for benefits already paid to the beneficiary, or as a basis for de-
nying or terminating benefits because the trust constitutes an excess resource.' 16
The courts uniformly state that the intent of the creator of the trust is dispositive,
and attempt to clarify that intent by examining the following factors: 1) whether the
intent of the creator of the trust is clear based on the trust language, or whether it is
necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust; 2)
how the particular form of trust is treated under the relevant state trust statutes and
the eligibility rules for the government benefits at issue; and 3) whether there are
superceding principles of public policy that dictate a particular result.
(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the
voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach
his interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a discretionary
trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee
under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply to his benefit.
Id. The exceptions are Delaware and Alaska, each of which have enacted "asset protection"
statutes that allow individuals to transfer assets into a trust, retain a beneficial interest, and
limit the ability of creditors to attach the trust assets. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110; DEL.
CODE ANN. TIT. 12 §§ 3570-76. See also, Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Lawfor Sale: Alaska and
Delaware Compete for the Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth that Follows, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 831 (May 1999). The availability of trusts under the SSI and
Medicaid programs, including these asset protections trusts, will nevertheless depend on the
language of the trust document within the framework of the applicable SSI and Medicaid
statutes. It is usually easy to distinguish between third-party trusts and self-settled trusts.
The trust is considered to be self-settled when it is funded with assets owned by the benefici-
ary, even if the trust is created by another person or entity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hickey,
635 N.E.2d 853 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994) (holding that beneficiary is the true settlor of
trust created by insurer and funded with settlement of personal injury lawsuit). Cf Trust
Company of Oklahoma v. State Department of Social Services, 825 P.2d 1295 (Sup. Ct.
Oklahoma 1991), cert. denied 506 U.S. 906 (1992). For self-settled trusts established prior
to OBRA '93, this meant that the excess assets had to be spent before the beneficiary could
qualify for Medicaid.
116 See infra Part III.A.
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The following sections are organized by rough categorical groupings: 1) discre-
tionary support trust cases; 2) cases that involve primitive supplemental support
language and strong statements of public policy; and 3) cases in which courts de-
termine a trust's availability by relying on federal law, language in the trust that
clearly demonstrates an intent to supplement without replacing government bene-
fits, or a combination of these elements. These cases illuminate how elements of
language, law, and public policy converge to influence a court's decision. The is-
sue in each case is whether a trust is an available resource for the support of a bene-
ficiary who receives government benefits.
1. Discretionary Support Trusts: Courts Reach Unpredictable Results
A trustee is not permitted to abuse any discretionary powers granted in the trust
instrument. If a trustee is granted "discretion" to decide what level of support is
appropriate or necessary, a court may apply a reasonableness standard and subject
the trustee's decisions to a high level of scrutiny." 7 If the trust grants "absolute" or
"sole" discretion, the trustee may be given more deference according to an "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard."1 8 The scope of the trustee's discretion is the pri-
mary basis for a court's use of either a "reasonable" or "arbitrary" standard. The
difference in these standards reflects a range of what constitutes abuse along the
same continuum of discretion. 9
Cases such as these had to be litigated because the intent of the creator of the
trust and the applicable statutes did not clearly resolve the issue of availability. 20
The key issue is whether it is an abuse of discretion for a trustee to decide not to
provide basic support for a beneficiary who is eligible for means-tested government
benefits. The split in the courts involving cases with similar trust language and
factual circumstances suggests that a court's assessment tends to reflect its view of
public policy, rather than a predictable application of interpretive principles or
statutory law.'
21
a. Resolving the Impasse By Requiring the Trustee to Support the
Beneficiary
In Bureau of Support in Department of Mental Hygiene and Correction v. Kreit-
117 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW ON Trusts § 1870).
118 Id. (stating that a trustee may act unreasonably, but may not arbitrarily disregard the
purpose of the settlor).
119 Lang v. Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335, 1343 (Pa.
1987) (citing Lawrence Frolik, Estate Planning for Parents of Mentally Disabled Children,
40 U. PITT. L. REv. 305, 328 (1979)).
120 The lack of clarity in the trust results from the use of general language that does not
specifically address whether the trustee should take into account the beneficiary's eligibility
for government benefits in deciding whether the trust should be used for basic support. In
addition, there may be state "welfare" statutes that define indigence that conflict with trusts
statutes or common law that respect the trustee's exercise of discretion unless it is arbitrary.
"21 See infra at 39-58.
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zer,'22 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that a trustee with "sole and absolute" dis-
cretion to provide for the "care, comfort, maintenance and general well-being" of
the beneficiary could be compelled to provide basic support if the beneficiary was
destitute.123 The court identified an "impasse" that created a Catch-22: if the State
fulfilled its obligation to meet the beneficiary's needs, the trustee could reasonably
decide that it was not necessary to use the trust to provide for the beneficiary.
Therefore, it would never be necessary to provide basic support to a beneficiary
who received subsistence government benefits. Relying on a novel (albeit ques-
tionable) theory of subrogation to resolve this dilemma, the court held that the State
could enforce whatever rights the beneficiary had in order to compel distributions
from the trust. In essence, the court disregarded the language of the trust in favor
of the right of the government to be reimbursed from the trust property. The
court's theory nullified the creator's apparent intent to allow the trustee to exercise
"sole and absolute" discretion in deciding whether distributions were necessary.
The Court elevated the State to a "super" creditor and created an exception to the
general rule that a trustee of a discretionary trust may exercise her discretion with-
out disruption.
In an earlier case decided in 1958, an appellate state court in California similarly
held that it was an abuse of discretion when a trustee refused to make payments for
the support of a beneficiary residing in a state hospital because of mental illness.' 24
The relevant provision of the trust first directed the trustee to pay for the "proper
care, support, and maintenance" of the beneficiary, and then gave the trustee "com-
plete and absolute discretion" as to how much should be expended.'25 The state's
discretionary trust statute clearly applied to the trust and supported the trustee's de-
cision not to make payments for the beneficiary's basic support.'26 Curiously, the
court relied on two California welfare statutes that were not directly applicable,'27
and a New York case that directed reimbursement of the State by the trustee of a
discretionary trust. 2 ' The court held that the public policy of California requires
that the assets in a spendthrift trust can be used to support a beneficiary who is a
recipient of public benefits.'29 The court stated that it "[w]ould be unreasonable to
122 243 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1968).
123 Id. at 85, 86.
124 In re Estate of Lackmann, 320 P.2d 186 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
125 Id. at 188.
126 The language of the statute was as follows: "[A] discretionary power conferred upon a
trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the
property Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred
by the declaration of trust." Id. at 189.
127 The statutes in question, Sections 6555 and 6550 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
concerned liability for the support of a mentally ill person by a guardian, certain relatives,
and the estate of the mentally ill person. The court explained that "estate" includes the
"beneficiary interest." Id. However, this analysis was in direct conflict with the controlling
statute governing discretionary trusts.
128 In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sur. Ct. Monroe County 1953).
129 Estate of Lackman, 320 P.2d at 189.
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hold that any discretion given a trustee in the administration of a trust for another's
care could enable the trustee to cast his care and maintenance on the state."'"3
In McNiff v. Department of Public Welfare,'3' a Minnesota court presumed that
the creator's intent was to use the trust assets to provide basic support so the bene-
ficiary would not have to be dependent on government benefits. This analysis fo-
cused more on the intent of the creator, rather than the decision of the trustee within
the context of the applicable state law. The underlying theme embraced by the
court is that public assistance is a charitable benefit that is provided through the
largesse of government, rather than because of an entitlement.'32
In Button v. Elmhurst National Bank,'33 a parent established a discretionary trust
for the primary benefit of a mentally ill son, as well as for permitting distributions
for his other child.'34 Despite discretionary language, the court based its conclusion
on prior decisions that a spendthrift trust could be considered part of a beneficiary's
estate and on Illinois public policy that seeks payment for the state's costs from
those recipients with the means to pay.'35
After finding that the language of the trust was not clear, the court looked to cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the trust in order to determine the settlor's
intent. The court assumed that the settlor knew that, under Illinois law, he would
be required to reimburse the government agency for services provided to his son
while residing in a public institution. If the trust did not specifically provide oth-
erwise, that court held that "[I]t is more likely the trust was intended to pay for such
130 Id. at 187-88.
'' 176 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1970).
132 See also, In re Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1979) (holding that a
third-party spendthrift support trust was available to reimburse the mentally ill beneficiary's
sister for "necessaries" she purchased for the beneficiary which consisted mostly of nursing
home expenses.)
133 522 N.E.2d 1368 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist. 1988).
134 Id. The relevant language in the trust read as follows:
My son, KENNETH CHARLES BUTTON, has from time to time been mentally ill, and
it is my primary concern that his maintenance and support be adequately provided for. I
have one other child, my daughter, BEVERLY BUTTON BERNHARDT. Upon the
death of my wife, or upon my death if she predeceases me, the Trustee shall hold all the
Residuary Trust, as then constituted, as a single trust so long as my said son, KENNETH
CHARLES BUTTON, shall be living. In the meantime, the Trustee shall use or expend
and apply so much or all of the income or principal from the Trust as the Trustee deems
necessary, in such manner as it deems best, for the medical care, support, education and
welfare of either child of mine. The Trustee may use the same entirely for the benefit of
one of my children to the exclusion of the other and may completely exhaust the princi-
pal of the Residuary Trust for the maintenance and support of either child of mine,
rather than preserve the principal for distribution upon the termination of the Trust.
Id. at 1370-71.
..5 Id. at 1375 (citing Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v.
Philips, 500 N.E.2d 29 (I11. 986)).
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charges."' 36 Perhaps the decisive factor was the amount of assets in the trust, which
were large enough to reimburse the government agency and still provide for the
beneficiaries.
A recent case decided by the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Kryzsko v. Ram-
sey County Social Services,'37 also illustrates the influence of public policy on a
court's analysis. Margaret Kryzscko is described as a "52-year-old mentally dis-
abled woman."' 38 Margaret's deceased father created a trust for her in his will,
which was funded with $32,000.1'9 The local Medicaid agency determined that the
assets in the trust were an available resource that made Margaret ineligible for
Medicaid benefits. 40 The trust contained the typical "discretionary support" lan-
guage that has engendered so much litigation:
I devise Margaret Lee Kryzsko...share of my estate to my Trustee to administer said
share for the benefit of her by paying to or applying for her benefit so much of the in-
come and/or principal of such share as the Trustee, in her sole discretion, thinks neces-
sary or advisable to providefor the proper care, maintenance, support, and education of
Margaret Lee Kryzsko. . provided, that the Trustee must make at least an annual distri-
bution of the Trust income, or more frequent distribution as the Trustee, in its sole dis-
'41cretion deems necessary....
Although the court states that the "key issue" is whether the trust is a support
trust or discretionary trust, it acknowledges that the trust contains elements of
both. 42 The court states that a preponderance of the evidence supported the De-
partment's finding that "[T]here is no indication the trustor intended the trust
should not be used to provide primary support or maintenance for Ms. Kryzsko."'
43
The court concludes that the "[p]lain language of the trust demonstrates an intent
by the trustor to provide for the future support and care of Ms. Kryzsko."'
'
The dissent in Kryzsko argued that the language of the trust clearly expressed the
intent to create a discretionary trust, which would not be counted as an available
asset. 45 The dissent pointed to the following: 1) the trustee had "sole discretion"
136 Id. at 1378. At the time, the applicable statute made parents responsible for services
provided to individuals in a State hospital without regard to the individual's age. The court
failed to mention that this legal responsibility ended upon the death of the parent.
13' 607 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 2000).
131 Id. at 238.
139 Id.
140 id.
141 Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
142 Under North Dakota law, a support trust is available to a Medicaid applicant or recipi-
ent, but a discretionary trust is not. Id. at 239 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-
31(3)(4)). The court distinguished its decision from an earlier case, Hecker v. Stark Cty. So-
cial Serv. Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994). In Hecker, the trust gave the trustee "sole dis-
cretion" to determine when it was "necessary or advisable" to provide for the beneficiary's
special needs. Kryzsko, at 240 (citing Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 228).





over the trust; 2) the trustee had sole discretion, after making at least one annual
distribution of trust income, to decide if more income was "necessary or advis-
able;" and 3) the trust was only funded with $32,000 which was too small a sum to
provide for the beneficiary's support during her lifetime. 4 6 The crux of the dissent
is that giving the trustee discretion makes the trust unavailable, even if the discre-
tion is to be exercised within a standard of support.
The Kryzsko case demonstrates that the issue of the trust's availability depends
on how a court views the underlying policy behind the rule of law. The trustee had
a duty to provide a "proper" level of support and there is no question that the bene-
ficiary had a right to seek redress in court if she believed the trustee was abusing
her discretion. However, the trust does not indicate how the beneficiary's eligibil-
ity for Medicaid should be factored into the trustee's exercise of discretion. The
court professes to find a clear intent that the trustee should provide support, quoting
an authoritative treatise which states that if a trustee is "[d]irected to pay as much
of the income and principal as is necessary for the support of a beneficiary, he can
be compelled to pay at least the minimum amount which in the opinion of a reason-
able man would be necessary." '47
Alas, what is "necessary" in the opinion of a "reasonable man?" Would a "rea-
sonable woman" answer the question differently? Is it necessary to provide basic
support to avoid having the beneficiary qualify for government benefits? Does the
receipt of government benefits make it unnecessary to provide basic support or
medical expenses? The answers to these questions depend on one's attitudes about
poverty, the nature of government benefits, disability, donative freedom, and the
role of private assets to provide basic support to a needy individual.
The underlying assumption of the courts that have held these trusts to be an
available resource is that the creator would not have wanted the beneficiary to re-
ceive government benefits before the trust assets were depleted. This assumption is
predicated on a view of government benefits as charity, and not as an entitlement.
However, an alternative analysis of the synthesis of "discretion" and "support"
within the context of public policy informed the decision of other courts faced with
similar ambiguities of language and intent.
b. Another Perspective on Reasonable Discretion: An Entitlement Theory of
Public Policy
A parallel line of cases holds that a discretionary support trust is not available to
the beneficiary receiving government benefits. Some courts use a relatively simple
analytical approach: they emphasize the grant of discretion to the trustee as the
critical factor, and treat the support language as "[a]n insignificant limitation on the
trustee's discretionary powers."' 48
146 id.
141 Id. at 241-42 (citing WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 187 (1988)).
148 This was the approach taken in Chenot v. Bordeleau, 561 A.2d 891 (R.I. 1989). In
Chenot, the father of a mildly mentally retarded adult created a trust that directed the trustee
to pay all or a portion of the income and principal for the son "[a]s the said trustee, in its sole
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In Lang v. Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare,49 the beneficiary,
William LeViseur, was an adult who had lived in state institutions from the time he
was diagnosed with "Idiopathic Epilepsy" and "Mental Deficiency as a thirteen
year old in 1946."' "0o The trust at issue was created by the beneficiary's father for
the benefit of his four children, including William, and was funded with approxi-
mately $118,000.1' The relevant portions of the trust stated that:
(1) During the lifetime of my son, WILLIAM GEORGE LeVISEUR, if he
survives me, the Trustee shall pay the Income periodically to or for the sup-
port, maintenance, welfare and benefit of my said son or may, in the Trustee's
discretion, add part or all of the Income to principal, to be invested as such.
(2) The Trustee may distribute such part of the Income not necessary for the
support of my son, in equal shares to my three children...
(3) The Trustee shall use so much of the principal as may in her opinion be
advisable therefor, for the support, maintenance, welfare, comfort and support
of my son, WILLIAM GEORGE LeVISEUR. The Trustee shall have com-
plete discretion as to how much shall be used for such purposes and may pay
the sums to any person or institution having the care of my said son, without
liability on the part of the Trustee to see to the application thereof, or directly
to or for the benefit of my said son....
The court held that the trustee had the power, but not the duty, to support the bene-
ficiary who therefore could not compel the trustee to provide support if adequate
public funding was available.'53 The court explicitly disavowed the lower court's
"implication" that receiving welfare was not in the beneficiary's interest. 54 Noting
that a parent's legal duty of support ended when a child reached the age of 18, the
court asserted that the policy of the state's mental health law, "[d]oes not reflect
this vision of public assistance as charity and the consequent assumption that a set-
tlor intended to exhaust his family's patrimony before his beneficiary could take
advantage of public funds."'55
and uncontrolled discretion, shall deem necessary or advisable for his comfort, support and
welfare." Id. at 892. Apparently the trust also named a daughter as a beneficiary, but ex-
pressed the intent that the trustee shall exercise its discretion primarily for the benefit of the
disabled child "[b]ecause of his special needs and circumstances." Id. at 892-93. The court
also noted that the will granted the trustee sole discretion in six different places, which re-
flected the testator's emphasis on the trustee's discretion powers over his duty to support the
beneficiary. Id. at 894.
149 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987).
"so Id. at 1339.
'51 Id. After the father's death, Pennsylvania amended its laws so that the duty to support
a person receiving services under the Mental Health Act ended when the beneficiary
reached the age of eighteen. Id. at 1340.
152 Id. at 1340-41 (emphasis omitted).
"' Id. at 1341.
114 Id. at 1342.
"5 Id. The court also identified the following indicia of the testator's intent to consider
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The Lang decision rejected the rigid categorization of trusts as either "support"
or "discretionary." Each of these two forms of trusts fails to meet the needs of a
person with a disability: a support trust risks rapid depletion and a discretionary
trust prevents a beneficiary from compelling distributions." 6 The court refused to
leave the creator of a trust faced either with the decision to bankrupt his family or
to leave a disabled child wholly dependent on an unpredictable, and frequently in-
adequate, system of government benefits. The court in Lang used public policy to
support its decision despite decidedly ambiguous language in the trust and evidence
of intent that was hardly compelling.'57 The beginning of this public policy can be
found in a series of earlier cases.
2. Contextual Analysis, Public Policy, and Intent: Courts Protect Trusts from
Government Agencies
In a 1961 case, a Wisconsin court relied on the language in a testamentary trust
as well as on public policy, to protect the trust from the claim of a government
agency. 15 The testator established a $2,000 trust for the benefit of his "incompe-
tent" son, who resided in a state mental institution. The trust stated that "funds
shall be used for such comforts, luxuries, necessities and such other provisions as
may not be provided for by said institution, and to place such assets beyond the
reach of his creditors."'59 The Wright court rejected the government's argument
that maintaining the beneficiary in the hospital was a "comfort and necessity" that
should be paid by the trust."6 The court held that no public policy existed "[t]o
prohibit a person who is not liable for the support of a charity patient in a public
institution to give to the patient extra comforts or luxuries or, at need, necessities
which the institution does not furnish nor do we find a public policy to seize such
gifts before the patient has received them."'' The court declined to exercise its
discretion to apply the trust for the beneficiary's support.'62 The "sacred" and
"constitutional" right of a person to make a will and have it carried out was clearly
other sources of support and to use the trust as a supplemental resource: the trust permitted
income not distributed to be added to principal, indicating a grant of discretion; the words
"welfare and benefit" connote a broader standard than merely minimal support; the trustee
has the complete discretion to make decisions about principal; the use of one trust rather than
separate trusts indicated the desire to provide for all of his children; and during his lifetime
the father paid only 37% of the monthly care despite his liability for support. Id. at 1343.
156 Id. at 1344-45.
157 See also, Snyder v. Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare, 598 A.2d 1283
(Pa. 1991) (holding that testamentary trust in which trustee had discretion to decide the
amount of income and principal "necessary or desirable for the support, maintenance and
care of my two children..." was not an available asset to her disabled son receiving publicly
funded medical assistance).
158 In re Wright's Will, 107 N.W.2d 146 (Wis. 1961).
'59 Id. at 377.
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a factor in the court's decision."6 3
The decision foreshadowed the evolution of judicial and societal attitudes toward
government benefits and toward people with disabilities. These forces created a
different lens through which courts interpreted trust language and extrinsic circum-
stances surrounding the establishment of the trust, to discern the intent of the crea-
tor of the trust. 164
A Bronx County, New York court articulated this new public policy context in
the 1978 case of In re Escher.165 Marie Escher, the beneficiary of the trust, was re-
siding in a state hospital due to mental illness. The issue was whether the principal
of the trust was available to reimburse a government agency for the costs it had in-
curred caring for the beneficiary in a state hospital for over 31 years."
The trust in Escher gave the trustee discretion to invade principal to provide for
the beneficiary in circumstances limited to "illness, accident, or other emergency."
The court began by utilizing the usual analytical approach: it explored the intent of
the trust creator by reviewing the language of the trust and then moved on to extrin-
sic circumstances. The decision became more compelling as the court began to ex-
plore the circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust. In addition to the
testator's knowledge of the beneficiary's personal circumstances, the court drew on
the socioeconomic context of the Great Depression to interpret his intent.
The court held that Martin Escher could not have conceived that the income of
the trust would be insufficient to pay for the cost of his daughter's care because of
the economic reality that existed during the Depression when he created the trust.
The court emphasized the changing nature of government benefits from charity to
an entitlement. In particular, the rising costs and diminished stigma attached to the
receipt of institutional care buttressed the court's interpretation of Martin Escher's
intent.
Although not labeling it as such, the court essentially applied anobjective test to
discern the creator's intent. Under this kind of test, it is not the creator's intent per
se, but the presumable intent of a reasonable person standing in the position of the
creator. The Escher decision's use of constitutional law and socioeconomic factors
was unique, but it was not alone in its articulation of a public policy in favor of
163 Id. at 380.
164 The United States Supreme Court decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
played an important role in the transformation of government benefits from a charitable
benefit to a federal entitlement. This transformation had a profound impact on the way
courts analyzed trusts for disabled beneficiaries who received government benefits, even if
not expressly made part of the opinion. Unfortunately, the federal entitlement to government
benefits for the nation's poorest children was eliminated on August 22, 1996, when the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was replaced with Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families block grants. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et
seq. (2000).
165 407 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1978). See text supra note 5.
166 The government benefits at issue were administered solely by New York State and did
not include federally funded benefits such as Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid.
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protecting trusts from the claims of government agencies. In a number of other ju-
risdictions, courts agreed that "public policy does not forbid the beneficiary of a
private trust from receiving support at public expense."' 67
3. Courts Apply Federal Medicaid Law and Honor the Clear Expression of
Intent to Supplement Government Benefits
The foregoing sections demonstrate that a court's interpretation of a trust can
turn on a phrase, on the choice to rely on one state statute rather than another, or on
the court's view of public policy. In many of these cases, the beneficiary received
government benefits administered solely by the state, and not by federal entitle-
ments under the Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income programs.
68
a. Federal Law Supplies Criteria for Determining if a Trust is an "Available
Resource"
Inevitably, courts had to analyze whether a trust was an "available asset" under
the financial eligibility criteria that governed the federal SSI and Medicaid pro-
grams. Alabama Medicaid Agency v. Primo involved a testamentary trust that was
established by the sister of a beneficiary who resided in a nursing home and re-
ceived Medicaid. 69 The sister's will included a trust that directed the trustees to do
the following:
[t]o pay to or use for the benefit of my sister, MAE KLAAS PRIMO, so much
of the net income and principal as my Trustees, in their sole discretion, deter-
mine to be adequate, reasonable, and appropriate for her support, maintenance,
and medical care. The term 'medical care' as used herein shall be broadly
construed, and shall include doctors, nurses, hospitals, retirement homes, and
nursing homes. Any part of the net income not paid out shall be accumulated
and added to and vested and thereafter treated as part of the principal of said
trust. 170
The court did not focus on the language of the trust, or on whether the trust could
be categorized as a discretionary or support trust. Instead, the analysis revolved
around the issue of whether the trust was an "available resource" to the beneficiary
for purposes of her eligibility for Medicaid. 7 '
In 1974, Alabama had opted to become an "SSI state" and therefore could not
utilize eligibility criteria for Medicaid that was more restrictive than the SSI crite-
167 See, e.g., Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services, 425 A.2d 553, 559 (1979); Town
of Randolph v. Roberts, 195 N.E.2d 72 (Mass. 1964).
168 Medicaid was created in 1965 and the Supplemental Security Income program was
enacted in 1974. Many of the cases were decided prior to these programs. Even after these
dates, a beneficiary may receive benefits under a state-administered program that is gov-
erned by state law and has no connection to either Medicaid or SSI.
169 579 So. 2d 1355 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
170 Id. at 1356.
171 id.
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ria. 72 Thus, the court relied on the following provisions of the SSI Program Op-
erations Manual System: 1
*the principal of the trust is not a resource if the beneficiary's access is re-
stricted, meaning that only a trustee or court can invade the principal;
*the trust principal is not a resource even if the trust provides a regular pay-
ment from the principal to the beneficiary;
-if the beneficiary has unrestricted access, the trust principal is an available re-
source; and
-even if the trustee has discretion to invade the principal for the beneficiary's
support and maintenance, it should not be counted as a resource.
The use of the SSI federal eligibility criteria to determine the availability of a trust
made it unnecessary to categorize the trust as a discretionary trust, a support trust,
or some form of hybrid trust.1"4 This analytical methodology of trusts avoids the
semantics and interpretive hair-splitting that often plagued the analysis of discre-
tionary trusts for beneficiaries who received government benefits.'75
b. Courts Honor the Intent to Provide for a Beneficiary's Supplemental
Needs
Although applying federal Medicaid law provided a favorable and more predict-
able framework in which to analyze trusts for a beneficiary receiving SSI or Medi-
caid, courts still had to identify and follow the creator's intent. We have seen how
the use of general language to guide the trustee's discretion to make distributions
for the support of the beneficiary creates uncertainty. Ambiguous language gives a
court the opportunity to utilize its own concept of public policy or fairness to
achieve a certain result.
In contrast, a trust that clearly expresses the creator's intent to supplement and
not to replace government benefits will not be considered an available resource.' 76
The use of supplemental language became more common as lawyers and clients
172 Id. at 1358. In Primo, the availability of a trust under the Alabama statute depended
on the terms of the trust instrument. Id. at 1356. Although the statute on its face was not
more restrictive than the POMS, the court held that the agency's interpretation was arbitrary
and unreasonable. Id. at 1359.
'73 Id. at 1358, (citing Social Security Administration, Department of Health & Human
Services, Program Operations Manual System, SI 01120.105 A. 2 (October 1981)). Popu-
larly known as "POMS," these are the administrative directions issued by the Social Security
Administration.
174 Id. at 1358. See also, In re Carlisle Trust, 498 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. App. 1993) (ap-
plying POMS guidance for evaluating the availability of trusts under SSI program).
175 See supra Part III.A.I.
176 See, e.g., In re Carlisle Trust, 498 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. App. 1993); Hecker v. Stark
City Soc. Serv. Bd., 527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994).
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became aware of the problems caused by trusts that were not explicit regarding
their availability for government benefit.
In Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services,' a parent established a spendthrift
trust for two "mentally handicapped" sisters who were receiving medical assis-
tance. '78 The issue of eligibility for medical assistance depended on two factors: 1)
whether the testator intended the trust to be a supplemental or general source of
support; and 2) whether the limitations on the trust prevented it from being consid-
ered an available asset under state and federal Medicaid law.'79 The court analyzed
whether the trustee abused his discretion based on the language of the entire will
"in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator when the instrument was
executed, including the condition of his estate, his relations to his family and bene-
ficiaries and their situation and condition.""'8 The court in Zeoli held that it is not
an abuse of discretion for a trustee of a supplemental needs trust to withhold funds
from one or more beneficiaries and to consider other funds that might be available,
'7 425 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1979).
178 The assets in the trust were $9,515.85. The relevant language in the trust directed the
trustee as follows:
To pay or apply so much of the net income or the principal of such trust to or among
either one or both of my daughters as shall be living from time to time during the term
of such trust, and in such proportions and amounts as my Trustee shall determine in his
absolute and uncontrolled discretion. Such amounts of net income or principal may be
paid or applied without regard to equality of distribution and regardless of whether any
one of my daughters may be totally deprived of any benefit hereunder. My Trustee, in
exercising his absolute and uncontrolled discretion shall not be required to consider the
amount of income from other sources of any beneficiary or the amount of any benefici-
ary's independent property or the extent to which any beneficiary may be entitled to
support by a parent or any other person. The judgment of my Trustee as to the alloca-
tion of the net income or principal of this trust among the beneficiaries shall be final and
conclusive upon all interested persons and upon making such payments or application
my Trustee shall be full released and discharged from all further liability or account-
ability therefor. My Trustee shall not be required to distribute any net income of such
trust currently and may, in his absolute and uncontrolled discretion, accumulate any part
or all of the net income of such trust, which such accumulated net income shall be avail-
able for distribution to the beneficiaries as aforesaid.
Without in any way limiting the absolute discretion of my Trustee, it is my fond hope
that my trustee pay or apply the net income or principal of the trust for the maintenance,
support, education, health and general welfare of those of my daughters who my Trustee
believes would benefit most from a share of the income of this trust after considering the
income of the beneficiaries from other sources ....
Id. at 555. Under Connecticut law, a trust is "spendthrift" and insulated from creditors
where the trustee has the power to accumulate or withhold income or the income is intended
to support the beneficiary or her family. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-321 (2000).
19 425 A.2d 553, 554 (1979). The court also had to preliminarily find that the assets
were actually part of the testamentary trust.
'"o 425 A.2d 553, 556 (1979).
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including public assistance.'
James Carlisle was a 58-year-old with cerebral palsy who depended on his
mother for his daily care until she could no longer care for him."8 2 James subse-
quently qualified for Medicaid to cover the cost of the home care he needed. His
mother created a discretionary trust for the purpose of providing "[e]ntertainment,
education, travel, comfort (including home improvement), convenience, and rea-
sonable luxuries as the trustee, in its full discretion, deems advisable." ' 3 The trus-
tee was prohibited from making payments for basic support provided by a govern-
ment agency; instead the trustee was required to "[m]ake distributions only to
supplement and not to supplant such public assistance . 1.8."1" The court held that
the language of the trust clearly demonstrated the creator's intent that the trust be
administered so as not to jeopardize the beneficiary's eligibility for government
benefits. 185
The trust at issue in Hecker v. Stark County Soc. Serv. Bd. '86 contained an expla-
nation of intent that could not have been more explicit.'87 The trust used exemplary
supplemental language and included illustrations of permissible expenditures for
special needs, such as "[m]edical and dental expenses, clothing and equipment,
programs of training, education, treatment, and essential dietary needs to the extent
that such needs are not provided by any government entity."'8 8 The court held that
the trust was not an available asset.
The courts' acceptance of third-party trusts that featured increasingly sophisti-
cated drafting encouraged parents who desperately wanted to include their disabled
child in their estate plans, but feared jeopardizing essential government benefits for
that child. However, advocacy efforts to enact legislation that authorized the use of
supplemental needs trusts were fueled by the variation and unpredictability of the
courts.,89
181 425 A.2d 553, 557 (citing In re Hinckley's Estate, 195 Cal. App. 2d 164, 170; Town
of Randolph v. Roberts, 195 N.E.2d 72; In re Wright's Will, 107 N.W.2d 146).
182 In re Carlisle Trust, 498 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. Ct. App.1993).
183 Id.
184 Id.
"' Id. at 266.
186 527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994).
187 The language in the trust included the following:
[I]t is the Grantor's express intent that because the beneficiary is developmentally dis-
abled and unable to support and maintain himself independently, the Trustee
shall.. .seek support and maintenance from all available public resources.... In mak-
ing distributions.. .[the] Trustee shall take into consideration the applicable resource
limitations of the public assistance programs for which the beneficiary is eligible.
Id. at 230.
"'8 Id. at 228.
'89 There is also inconsistency in the drafting of these trusts by attorneys. For a proposal
to remedy this problem, see infra Part V.C. I. Because a third-party beneficiary of a trust
does not usually have standing to sue a drafting attorney for malpractice, the beneficiary of a
faulty trust may be without recourse. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
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B. States Create Different Statutory Models Authorizing Trusts for People with
Disabilities
The primary benefit of having a statute that specifically authorizes the use of a
supplemental needs trust is clarity. The potential risk is that the statute will impose
limitations on the use of these trusts (e.g., the amount of money that can be placed
in the trust, the age of the beneficiary, etc.) or invalidate trusts that do not conform
to the statute. Some states rely on the common law and "generic" trust statutes to
guide the interpretation of SNTs. 9 Other states have enacted specific statutes that
govern supplemental needs trusts. Although a full survey of these statutes is be-
yond the scope of this Article, in the following sections I discuss four statutory
models that specifically authorize supplemental needs trusts: a comprehensive indi-
vidual trust statute; a "public-private" pooled family trust statute; statutes that
authorize trusts for people with disabilities, with little or no explanation; and stat-
utes that authorize trusts for people with disabilities, but impose restrictions.
1. A Comprehensive Statute: The New York Model
New York has a comprehensive statute that is flexible enough to accommodate a
variety of approaches in structuring a trust for a beneficiary who is a "[p]erson with
a severe and chronic or persistent disability." 9 ' The 1993 statute provides a
framework for interpreting SNTs and gives the benefit of favorable rules of con-
struction to conforming trusts. 192 The statute is divided into three main sections: 1)
a definitional section; 2) rules of construction for conforming trusts; and 3) speci-
men trust language. The statute explicitly sets forth the elements a trust needs in
order to qualify as a "statutory" supplemental needs trust. The statute does not af-
fect the interpretation of trusts that do not conform to the statute. This provision is
important to allow for variation in the structure and drafting that is inevitable, and
also does not automatically invalidate trusts that are drafted imprecisely and do not
fit the statutory criteria.
With respect to third-party trusts, the State has no right of recovery and no right
to place a lien as long as the following criteria are met: 1) the SNT was established
when the parent (or other third party) no longer had a duty to support the disabled
beneficiary; and 2) the trust was not funded with any property of the beneficiary
against the trust property. Parents can use the SNT to provide a lifetime source of
LAWYERS §§ 71-73.
190 These statutes are generic in the sense that they do not directly address a trust estab-
lished for a disabled beneficiary for the purpose of enabling the beneficiary to maintain eli-
gibility for government benefits. These statutes are often spendthrift statutes that delineate
exceptions to protect certain classes of creditors, or authorize a trustee to invade principal to
provide for the support of an income beneficiary. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2000) (establishing spendthrift presumption as to income but
authorizing assignment of income in excess of $10,000 for certain relatives); Id. § 7-1.6
(authorizing application of principal to income beneficiary for support and education).
191 Id. § 7-1.12(a)(4).
192 Id. § 7-1.12(b).
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supplemental support for a child who has a disability and can direct the distribution
of the remaining trust property upon the child's death. The statute originally in-
cluded a limited exception for self-settled trusts that were funded with retroactive
SSI benefits.1 93 After the enactment of OBRA '93, it was further amended to allow
self-settled trusts that conformed to the requirements of the state statute that im-
plemented OBRA '93.'94
New York's supplemental needs trust statute permits the creator of the trust to
choose among different options for structuring the trust, depending on the goals of
the creator and the circumstances of the beneficiary. For example, the trust can be
structured to prohibit direct payments to the beneficiary and forbid distributions for
food, clothing, shelter, or medical care covered by the relevant government benefit
program. This structure is "safe" because it eliminates the possibility that the bene-
ficiary's benefits may be reduced, yet it limits the discretion of the trustee to meet
the needs of the beneficiary. In addition, it could be risky if the current safety net
of government benefits is weakened or abolished. A court would have to approve
the modification of the trust to enable distributions for the beneficiary's basic sup-
port.
An alternative is to create a more flexible structure that allows for a broader
range of supplemental expenditures. 95 A structure that seeks to strike a balance
would give the trustee the limited power to make in-kind payments for food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care. Payments made in the form of in-kind distribu-
tions for food, clothing or shelter are considered "unearned income" and will gen-
erally reduce SSI payments by a maximum of one-third unless there is no actual
economic benefit to the beneficiary.'96 Payments for in-kind goods and services
other than food, clothing and shelter will not reduce SSI benefits.'97 Medicaid does
not have an in-kind income rule, and only income and resources actually available
to the Medicaid recipient would be counted for purposes of eligibility. The statute
includes specimen trust language that is not required, but will qualify a trust as a
"statutory" supplemental needs trust. The inclusion of this sample language pro-
vides a normative baseline that attorneys, courts, and government agencies can use
as a reference.
The New York statute is an excellent model because it operates on a number of
levels that are helpful to lawyers and clients. It addresses virtually all the drafting
issues that may arise and includes definitions and specimen language. The statute
"' Id. § 7-1.12(a)(5)(v).
194 id.
195 Generally the trustee is not authorized to make direct payments to the beneficiary.
However, if there is a possibility that the beneficiary will become self-supporting and not
require government benefits, it may make sense to authorize direct payments under carefully
defined circumstances. Any direct payments to a beneficiary receiving SSI or Medicaid will
be counted as income and result in a reduction or loss of those benefits.
196 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(West 2000); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1130(c)(2000); N.Y. CoMp.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-4.3(e)(2000). See also, Gordon v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 101 (2d
Cir. 1995); Ruppert v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1989).
197 REGAN ET AL., supra note 14, at § 8.10.
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serves as a source of information that enables clients and non-legal professionals to
better understand the law.
2. A Public-Private Partnership: The Missouri Family Trust
In 1989 the Missouri legislature enacted the Missouri Family Trust, an innova-
tive structure for third-party supplemental needs trusts.'98 Notably, the family trust
is intended to cover people with a broad range of physical and mental disabilities,
including "[plersons with a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, whether the impairment is congenital or acquired
by accident, injury or disease. '
The Family Trust is the only statute in Missouri that authorizes third-party sup-
plemental needs trusts established by a parent. The validity of an individual trust is
otherwise based on Missouri case law, which has generally been favorable." °
The Missouri Family Trust is an instrumentality of the state under Internal Reve-
nue Code § 115, which allows income from trust assets to be tax-exempt. A sepa-
rate charitable trust component exists to receive any remainder interests that are
donated from the individual trust accounts. The charitable trust also receives tax-
deductible donations and uses its assets to provide supplemental support and bene-
fits to disabled people who do not have any immediate family or whose family is
indigent. The Governor appoints the nine-member board of trustees. The board
must include three members of the immediate family of a person with mental ill-
ness, three members of the immediate family of a person with mental illness who is
receiving services from the state, and three members with business expertise.
The donor who creates the account designates the beneficiary and a co-trustee
(usually the donor or another family member) to advocate for the beneficiary. The
co-trustee meets annually with a representative from the Family Trust to decide the
amount of distributions and the nature of the services to be provided to the benefi-
ciary. A donor can revoke the trust account during his lifetime.2"' To avoid the
198 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 402.199-402.217 (West 2000). The Missouri Family Trust cur-
rently serves 300 families, has assets of approximately $8 million, and distributes $500,000
annually. August 4, 2000 telephone conversations with Jerry Zafft, Esq. The charitable
component has about $1.5 million in assets. Id. The average account contains $10,000. Id.
The trust has a limited exception for "self-settled" trust accounts funded with structured set-
tlements payable for the benefit of a disabled person from a personal injury case.
199 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 402.175 (West 2000) (declaration of policy-purpose of Missouri
family trust). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.175 (West 2000) (umbrella trust fund limited to
beneficiaries who are developmentally disabled or mentally ill).
200 See, e.g., Tidrow v. Director Division of Family Services, 688 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that parent's testamentary trust not available where trustee had discretion to
make distributions for beneficiary's "reasonable comfort"). See also, Gerald Zafft, The Mis-
souri Family Trust May Be Better Than Just Relying on a Discretionary Special Needs Trust,
JOURNAL OF THE MissouRi BAR, 155 (2000).
201 If an account is revoked, or upon the death of the beneficiary, the charitable trust is
entitled to 10% of the remainder if the beneficiary received government benefits for five
yeas or less and 25% if the beneficiary received benefits for more than five years.
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possibility that a family member who is a remainder beneficiary will revoke the
trust account after the death of the donor, a successor trust must be designated to
receive the assets in a revoked account after the death of the donor.
3. Simply General: California, Illinois, and Wisconsin
Other states have statutes that are more general and that merely exempt a trust
for a disabled individual from being subject to a claim for public support by a gov-
ernment agency.20 2 For example, in Wisconsin the disabled individual is defined as
a person "[w]ho has a disability which has continued or can be expected to con-
tinue indefinitely, substantially impairs the individual from adequately providing
for his or her own care or custody, and constitutes a substantial handicap to the af-
flicted individual. .". ."" In Illinois, the statute also defines a discretionary trust
(which will not be considered available to the beneficiary) as any trust in which the
trustee has discretionary power to determine distributions to be made under the
trust.2"4 This provision is important because it protects any trust that gives the
trustee discretion and avoids interpretive problems that might arise with poorly
drafted discretionary trusts.
4. Imposing Limits: Minnesota and Texas
In Texas, the amount that can be held in a trust for a person with mental illness
or mental retardation is limited to $50,000 for a person who resides in a state hos-
pital or who is a client of a mental health community center, 205 or $250,000 for a
mentally retarded resident of a care facility.20 6 Any amounts above those limits will
be considered available for the beneficiary's support.
The Minnesota statute sets forth the general purposes of a third-party supple-
mental needs trust that will not be considered "available" for purposes of govern-
ment benefits. 2 7 The trust must expressly prohibit any distributions that will re-
place or reduce a beneficiary's eligibility for government benefits, or make the
beneficiary ineligible for those benefits.2 8 This restricts the discretion of the trus-
tee and prevents the trust from being used for, inter alia, shelter payments that can
enhance housing options. However, the Minnesota statute excludes beneficiaries
over the age of 64 who have resided in nursing homes or other institutions for at
202 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.06(5m) (West 2000); CAL. PROB. CODE § 15306
(West 2000) (modeled after the Wisconsin statute); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/15.1 (2000).
203 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 701.06(Sm)(West 2000).
204 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/15.1 (West 2000).
205 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 534.0175 (West 2000) (community centers);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 552.018 (West 2000) (state hospital).
206 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 593.081 (West 2000) (residential care facility
for the mentally retarded).
207 MINN. STAT. § 501B.89(2) (2000). See also, Craig P. Goldman, Render Unto Caesar
That Which is Rightfully Caesar's, But Not A Penny More Than You Have To: Supplemental
Needs Trusts in Minnesota, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 639 (1997).
208 MINN. STAT. § 501B.89(2)(d) (2000).
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least six months and who are not reasonably expected to be discharged. This provi-
sion severely limits the use of supplemental needs trusts for elderly people with
disabilities.209
C. Bridging the Gap: the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Resolves (Most of) the Lump Sum Problem
During the federal budget reconciliation process in 1993 it became clear that
Congress intended to tighten the eligibility requirements for Medicaid in order to
prevent abuse of the program by the affluent elderly.2"' In particular, Congress
wanted to prevent the elderly from transferring assets into trusts and also wanted to
improve recovery from responsible third parties and the estates of Medicaid recipi-
ents.
The community of disability advocates was concerned about the potential loss of
protections that prior federal Medicaid law and state law had established for people
with disabilities and their parents. Advocates did not want Medicaid to prohibit
parents from using trusts to plan for the future of their disabled child."' In 1993, in
addition to individual trusts established by parents, there existed a number of
pooled trust arrangements established by nonprofit organizations and funded by
parents. The pooled trusts developed because banks would only act as trustee or
custodian if the amount of assets were substantial. The pooled trust typically
maintained individual accounts but pooled the money for purposes of investment in
order to interest banks in managing the aggregate amount. It enabled parents with
modest estates to establish a trust that would be managed by a professional. The
individual and pooled trusts that developed varied a great deal from state to state.
209 MINN. STAT. § 501B.89(2)(e) (2000).
210 For a discussion of the OBRA '93 legislative process, see Stewart Weisner, OBRA '93
and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in
Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679 (1995). Newspaper articles that appeared around this time
may have reinforced Congress' perception that Medicaid was being abused. See, e.g., Arthur
Caplan, Misusing Medicaid for the Wealthy, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Mar. 9, 1993, at 9A,
available in 1993 WL 7349387.
211 The discussion about the "advocacy community" refers primarily to the Arc and Na-
tional Alliance for the Mentally III (NAMI) organizations and their local chapters. These
groups were instrumental in helping to establish acceptance of trusts by state courts and leg-
islatures. During the budget process in 1993, the Arc, NAMI, and the Bazelon Center were
involved in the legislative process. My description of the legislative history of OBRA '93 is
based primarily on July 21 and August 4, 2000 telephone conversations with Ms. Marty
Ford, Director of Legal Advocacy, Governmental Affairs Office, the Arc of the United
States, 1730 K. Street Northwest, Suite 1212, Washington, D.C. 20006. Ms. Ford worked
closely with Andrew Schneider, a member of Congressman Waxman's staff and Jane Hor-
vath, a staff member of the Senate Finance Committee which was chaired by Lloyd Bentsen
in 1993. The written legislative history of the OBRA '93 trust provisions is sparse. See
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, House Report
No. 103-11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 511-37. In addition, after the 1994 elections,
virtually all of the people involved in the legislative process left the government.
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Representatives of several advocacy organizations had discussions with Con-
gressman Waxman's staff about their concerns. However, Medicaid amendments
are always among the final parts to be added to the huge budget reconciliation acts.
Furthermore, it was not until the last part of the process that advocates worked
closely with congressional staffers on the disability trust provisions. After the
House approved the Senate-House Conference Bill, there would be no opportunity
for advocates to review and discuss the language that dealt with trusts for people
with disabilities.
Advocates focused their efforts on four issues: 1) protecting trusts established by
a parent of a child with a disability from being considered an available resource to
the child; 2) allowing a transfer of assets to a disabled child or to a trust for a dis-
abled child by a parent who might later need Medicaid; 3) authorizing the use of
trusts that would be funded by lump sums, e.g., small settlements and inheritances
received by a disabled person; and 4) protecting existing pooled trust arrange-
ments.212 State courts and Medicaid agencies were becoming more receptive to
trusts that were created and funded by parents for the benefit of a disabled child.213
However, if a person with a disability received a "lump sum" in the form of a per-
sonal injury settlement or award, an inheritance, or other lump sum of money,
should she be able to transfer it into a trust and qualify for Medicaid? The lump
sum issue was particularly troubling in circumstances where a person was severely
and permanently injured through the negligence or malpractice of a third party. If
the injured person had been receiving Medicaid for a number of years, the Medi-
caid lien on the proceeds of the lawsuit could be substantial. Often, the victim (or a
guardian) had little incentive to bring a lawsuit because the proceeds would have to
be used to satisfy the lien. Even if there was not a substantial Medicaid lien, the
settlement or award would have to be spent on the cost of care before the person
could resume eligibility for Medicaid.21 4
Congress had brushed up against the idea of allowing a disabled person to trans-
fer "excess" assets into a trust after the Sullivan v. Zebley case.215 In Sullivan, the
U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Social Security Administration to revise the SSI
eligibility criteria for children to incorporate a broader range of factors in deter-
mining disability. As a result, thousands of children received retroactive benefits
that were approximately $5,000-$25,000 per class member. Congress specifically
authorized notices to Zebley class members, informing them that they could place
the retroactive benefits into a trust without jeopardizing their eligibility for SSI.
Advocates were also concerned about how the payback to the State would affect
pooled trusts. Existing pooled trusts were typically "third-party" trusts that were
funded by parents. The nonprofit organization that managed the trust usually re-
ceived a percentage of the remainder for two purposes: 1) it enabled the trust to
help beneficiaries who had outlived their own trust account; and 2) it enabled
212 Pooled trusts existing in 1993 included the Arc of Indiana Master Trust and the UJA-
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, Inc. Community Trust.
213 See infra Part III.A.
214 See infra Part IV.
215 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
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pooled trusts to provide advocacy and services to people who otherwise would not
have access to services.
What would happen if pooled trusts were opened up to assets owned by the per-
son with a disability? The congressional staffers agreed to allow the nonprofit to
keep a percentage, even the entire remainder, but any amounts that did not stay in
the pooled trust had to be used to pay back Medicaid. The pooled trust arrange-
ment was something that was unfamiliar to Capitol Hill, but Congressman Waxman
reportedly did not want to interfere with existing arrangements that were benefiting
people with disabilities and their families.216
The primary concern of Congress was to prevent "gaming" and misuse of the
Medicaid program by the elderly. In order to prevent a new loophole for the eld-
erly, the trust provisions were only going to be intended for people with disabilities
under the age of 65. Although many Democrats were ardent supporters of disabil-
ity rights, they were never comfortable with trust funds because they saw them as
devices used by rich people.217 Perhaps ironically, Republicans were perceived as
being more receptive to the use of trusts by people with disabilities and their fami-
lies.
When the lump sum issue was discussed, the Congressional staffers considered a
monetary limit to avoid potential misuse or abuse of trust arrangements on the
amount of money a disabled person could place into a trust for her own benefit.
Advocates were successful in making the case that a monetary limit did not make
sense. The needs of people with severe disabilities were quite diverse and while
$20,000 can help some people, others may need as much as $200,000 Instead of a
monetary limit, it was agreed that a State would be paid back from the assets that
remained in the trust when the beneficiary died. There also was agreement that
Medicaid would permit anybody (not only family members) to transfer assets to a
disabled person or to a trust for a disabled person who was under the age of 65
without imposing a penalty period.
Soon thereafter, the compromise budget bill was passed and included the Medi-
caid provisions from the House Bill. Upon their first opportunity to review the new
law, advocates saw that the legislation divided the individual and pooled trust pro-
visions into two separate sections. Advocates thought that the criteria for individ-
ual and pooled trusts would be identical, except that the remainder interest of a
pooled trust account could be retained by the trust. However, the legislation in-
cluded the following differences: 1) the individual trust was limited to a person un-
der the age of 65, but it could only be established by a parent, grandparent, legal
guardian or court; and 2) the pooled trust did not include the under-65 age limita-
tion and the person with a disability was authorized to create an individual trust ac-
count, in addition to the those listed in the individual trust section.
Advocates believed that these distinctions were technical drafting errors, created
when the provision was divided into separate sections to accommodate the reten-
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'93 trusts to individuals who were under 65 to avoid creating potential loopholes
for the elderly. Congress did not revisit these provisions for technical corrections.
Soon after, the majority in Congress shifted, resulting in the departure of many
long-time committee staff and the loss of much institutional memory on these is-
sues.
OBRA '93 disability trusts were exceptions to a general prohibition on the use of
self-settled trusts to shelter assets in order to qualify for Medicaid.2"' Prior to
OBRA '93, if a person wanted to transfer the money into a trust that would not be
considered an available resource under Medicaid, the trustee could not be given any
discretion to make distributions for the benefit of the creator or her spouse.219 The
law presumed that the trust assets were available to the full extent of the trustee's
discretion to distribute those assets.22 If the trustee could distribute the entire
amount of the trust in a particular circumstance, Medicaid would consider the full
amount of the trust available to the beneficiary."'
218 OBRA '93 substantially amended the portions of the Social Security Act that gov-
erned Medicaid rules regarding transfers of assets, the use of self-settled trusts, and recovery
against responsible third parties and estates of recipients. Congress expanded the "look
back" period for a transfer of assets into a trust from 36 months to 60 months. This meant
that when a person applied for Medicaid, the agency was entitled to examine all outright
transfers of assets for less than fair market value that took place 36 months prior to the
Medicaid application, and transfers into trusts that occurred up to 60 months earlier. If a
person made a "non-exempt" transfer of assets, the legislation permitted states to impose a
penalty period of ineligibility for Medicaid community services as well as institutionalized
services. In addition, the statute removed the limit on the length of a penalty period. Con-
gress abolished the use of self-settled trusts except under three circumstances: 1) an individ-
ual trust for a disabled person under the age of 65; 2) an income-only trust; and 3) a pooled
trust for a person with a disability. Finally, states were required to seek reimbursement for
the costs of Medicaid against responsible third parties and were given the option of expand-
ing the scope of property interests that could be recovered from the estate of a Medicaid re-
cipient. See, e.g., Stewart Weisner, OBRA '93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Avail-
ability and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679 (1995).
219 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2) repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XIII, § 1361 l(d)(l)(c),
107 Stat. 627(1993).
220 Id.
221 In 1986, this analytical approach was codified in the provisions of the federal statute
entitled "Medicaid Qualifying Trusts,"--surely a misnomer, because the trusts in these cate-
gories actually disqualified the Medicaid recipient for benefits. Id. A self-settled trust that
gave the trustee any discretion would be considered available for purposes of Medicaid eli-
gibility to the maximum extent of the trustee's discretion. Id. These provisions severely
limited the use of self-settled discretionary trusts by Medicaid applicants or recipients, and
the legal landscape is full of cases in which self-settled trusts were categorized as "MQT's"
and the trust assets were considered available, which made the beneficiary ineligible for
Medicaid. See, e.g., In re Kindt, 542 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding a 1991
discretionary self-settled trust for disabled persons void against public policy because it did
not limit distributions to those who would maintain the beneficiary's eligibility for govern-
ment benefits); Allen v. Wessman, 542 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1996)(1991 trust was a Medicaid
Qualifying Trust and available where trust assets could revert to creator if trustee exercised
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1. The Individual Payback Trust: A Bargain for Life
OBRA '93 created a new form of trust that could be funded with the assets of a
person with a disability without impairing her eligibility for Medicaid. An individ-
ual OBRA '93 trust is funded with the assets of a disabled beneficiary under the
age of 65 and must be established for the benefit of the disabled person by a parent,
grandparent, court or legal guardian.222 The beneficiary must be "disabled" as de-
fined under the Social Security Act.2 3 These trusts are exempt from the Medicaid
rules, which impose penalty periods on certain transfers of assets. 224 The trust as-
sets are not considered as "available" income or assets for purposes of the benefici-
ary's Medicaid eligibility.
22
The bargain is that the State must be "paid back" from the remaining balance
upon the death of the beneficiary up to the total value of medical assistance pro-
vided to the beneficiary.226 Implicit in this legislation is the belief that it is sound
discretion to terminate the trust).
222 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000).
223 An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if he
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically deter-
minable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months ....
42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A)(2000). Pursuant to the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the standard for a child under the age of 18 requires a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which results in marked and severe
functional limitations and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. The statute cre-
ated a stricter standard for a child's disability and replaced the "comparable severity to an
adult's disability" requirement which came out of the United States Supreme Court decision
in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
224 42 U.S.C. §1396p(c)(2)(B)(iv)(2000).
225 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A)(2000). The trust provisions of OBRA '93 are structured
so that the basic framework is that any trust that is self-settled,i.e., funded directly by the
Medicaid applicant or recipient, or on her behalf by a spouse, any other person, or a court,is
considered to be an available asset for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. The transfer of as-
sets into the trust will be subject to the rules that impose a penalty period of ineligibility. 42
U.S.C. §1396p(d)(l), (2), (3)(2000). The presumption of availability and the triggering of
the penalty period does not apply to a testamentary trust that is established as part of the in-
dividual's will. Id. A testamentary trust only activates upon the death of the person who
made the will and by definition must benefit someone other than the decedent.
226 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A)(2000). See also, In re Moretti, 606 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1993). Moretti was the first case in New York to apply OBRA '93. The
Conservator of a person who suffered severe brain damage sought to establish a supplemen-
tal needs trust that would be funded with the remaining proceeds of the settlement of the per-
sonal injury action. The Court held that the proposed supplemental needs trust was explic-
itly authorized by the new federal law and granted the request to transfer the funds she held
as Conservator into the trust with her as trustee. See also, Goldfarb & Stone, Supplemental
Needs Trustsfor Disabled Persons, 67 N.Y. St. Bar J. 32 (1995).
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public policy to allow a person with a disability to have an additional source of
support during her lifetime in exchange for granting the State Medicaid agency the
right to be reimbursed upon her death. This represents a departure from the rules
governing "available resources," which would otherwise make a person ineligible
for Medicaid. 227
2. Pooled Trusts: From Each According to Their Ability, To Each According
to Their Needs
It is rare that Congress passes legislation that redistributes wealth away from the
government and toward nonprofit groups that serve indigent individuals with se-
vere disabilities. Yet this is precisely the impact of the pooled trust provisions of
OBRA '93.22 s Pooled trusts arrangements were fairly well established in many
states as an option for parents and other family members to create and fund a third-
party trust account for a person with a disability. To the extent the remaining bal-
ance in an individual trust account is retained by the pooled trust after the death of
the beneficiary, the State is not entitled to be paid back.229 However, any amounts
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). Resources that are exempt for purposes of eligibility
for Supplemental Security Income are not counted by Medicaid for people who are elderly or
disabled. Id. These resource exemptions include a modest resource allowance, a burial ac-
count, a primary residence, an automobile, and certain tangible personal property. See 42
U.S.C. § 1382b(a).
228 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(2000). The exact language is as follows:
A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as defined in section
1382c(a)(3) of this title) that meets the following conditions:
(i) The trust is established and managed by a non-profit association.
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, but, for pur-
poses of investment and management of funds, the trust pools these accounts.
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of individuals who are
disabled (as defined in section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) by the parent, grandparent, or
legal guardian of such individuals, by such individuals, or by a court.
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon the death
of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust pays to the State from such
remaining amounts in the account an amount equal to the total amount of medical as-
sistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan under this subchapter.
229 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv)(2000). See In re Siegal, 645 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1996). There are few reported decisions on pooled supplemental needs trusts,
an indication that the legislation is not yet mature, or that it is working so effectively that
there are few disputes or problems. Siegal was the first reported decision in New York ana-
lyzing an OBRA '93 pooled trust. The case involved a request to transfer assets held in an
individual supplemental needs trust to the UJA-Federation Community Trust II. The Court
denied the request without prejudice because the charitable remainder beneficiaries of the
individual SNT had not provided written consent. However the court held that the trust met
the statutory requirements, did not require prior approval by the New York State Department
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that are not retained by the pooled trust must be used to reimburse the State for the
cost of medical assistance provided to the beneficiary during his or her lifetime.
Nonprofit groups perform caregiving functions that were previously the respon-
sibility of parents and, from a historical perspective, were assumed by the extended
family and informal support networks. The pooled trust provisions implicitly rec-
ognize this and expand the authority of these groups to assume financial manage-
ment responsibilities for people with disabilities.
The pooled trust must be "established and managed" by a "nonprofit associa-
tion. '130 The individual trust account must be created by one of the following: the
individual who has a disability; a parent; a grandparent; a legal guardian; or a court.
Pooled trusts are required to pool the sub-accounts together for purposes of invest-
ment and management, but individual accounts are maintained for each benefici-
ary.23' For persons under the age of 65, there is no penalty period for a transfer into
a pooled trust.232 However, the federal Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) has taken the position that a penalty period applies for transfers made by
those over the age of 65.233
The following table illustrates the differences between the individual trust and
the pooled trust under OBRA '93:
of Social Services, and was authorized to retain the remainder interest pursuant to the federal
statute. Id. at 1002.
230 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) (2000).
231 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) (2000).
232 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iv) (2000).
233 See HCFA Transmittal No. 64, supra note 7, § 3259.7(B).
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Individual Trust
1) Beneficiary must be under 65.
2) No penalty period for transfer
of assets into the trust.
3) Administered by trustee.
4) Assets invested separately.
5) Can only be established by:
parent, grandparent, legal
guardian, or a court.
6) Remainder to the State.
Pooled Trust
No age limit.
If beneficiary 65 or older,
transfer of assets into the
pooled trust may create
penalty period.
Operated and managed by
a non-profit group which
either acts as a trustee or
selects a trustee.
Assets pooled for investing.
Individual trust account can
be created by: the disabled
person, in addition to parent,
grandparent, legal guardian,
or a court.
Only amount of remainder
not retained by the pooled
trust paid back to the State.
The differences between the two forms of OBRA '93 "exception" trusts are sig-
nificant. The individual trust excludes a person with a disability who is 65 years of
age or older. A person under 65 is not permitted to create her own individual trust.
In contrast, the beneficiary of a pooled trust account can be any age, provided she
fits the definition of disabled under the Social Security Act, and can establish an
individual trust account for herself. However, a person 65 or older who transfers
assets into a pooled trust triggers a penalty period of ineligibility for Medicaid; a
transfer of assets into an OBRA '93 disability trust by a person under the age of 65
is exempt from the penalty period.
One can argue that it makes no sense to impose a penalty period of ineligibility
for Medicaid if the person who transfers assets into the pooled trust is over the age
of 65. Considering the overall purpose of the OBRA '93 Medicaid amendments-
to severely restrict access to Medicaid by elderly people with private wealth-the
penalty period is a moderately harsh mechanism that delays an elderly person's eli-
gibility for Medicaid or limits the amount of assets that can be transferred into the
pooled trust.""
234 The length of the penalty period of ineligibility for non-exempt transfers is calculated
as follows: the value of the assets transferred for less than fair market value is divided by the
monthly cost of a nursing home. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(l)(E)(1). The impact of the penalty
period may be mitigated in that federal law, while requiring a penalty period of ineligibility
for Medicaid coverage of institutionalized care, makes it optional for states to impose a pen-
alty period for community medical services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(l)(A). Even if a person
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a. The Remainder Option: An Opportunity for Nonprofits to Redistribute
Wealth and Expand Services
The right to elect to keep the remaining balance in the trust to be used for the
benefit of other beneficiaries creates a unique opportunity.23" The statute does not
give any guidance regarding the use of the remainder interest by the pooled trust: it
merely states that any amounts not retained by the pooled trust must be paid back to
the State. There are several possible interpretations: 1) divide any remainder
amounts among existing beneficiaries of the trust; 2) use the additional money to
create accounts for new beneficiaries; 3) use the remainder assets to provide serv-
ices to the beneficiaries of the trust; or 4) use the money for the general purposes of
the nonprofit group.
An unduly restrictive interpretation would require that these remainder funds be
distributed evenly among the other existing trust accounts in the "pool." However,
the statutory language gives the pooled trust far more discretion than this limited
reading suggests. A different, more reasonable view, is that remainder funds can be
used to create additional trust accounts for new beneficiaries. This would enable
the pooled trust to provide supplemental support to people with disabilities who
have needs that are not being fully met by government benefits.
A potential conflict of interest arises in the administration of pooled trusts in that
the trustee has an interest in the remaining balance of the trust account.236 The
trustee controls distributions, and knows whether the Sponsor has elected to allow
the pooled trust to retain any remaining balance upon the death of the beneficiary.
The less that is expended on the beneficiary, the more that will remain for the
pooled trust. Appropriate disclosures should be made to the Sponsor and the ad-
ministrator of the trust must be meticulous in assuring that decisions regarding dis-
tributions on behalf of beneficiaries are not influenced by the trust's remainder in-
terest.
In many ways, the relationship of nonprofits to their consumers who have dis-
abilities is more like a family relationship than a pure business relationship (e.g.,
requires Medicaid coverage of institutionalized care (e.g., in a nursing home), she can trans-
fer approximately one-half of her assets, and use the remaining assets to privately pay for the
cost of her care during the Medicaid penalty period of ineligibility. However, as of Decem-
ber 13, 1999, non-exempt transfers of resources will result in a penalty period of ineligibility
for Supplemental Security Income benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(b). This applies to a
transfer of resources made by a disabled person over the age of 65 into a pooled trust. Al-
though the maximum penalty period is 36 months, a non-exempt transfer of even a relatively
small sum will result in a substantial penalty period because the monthly SSI benefit gener-
ally does not exceed $600. This acts as a deterrent to the use of pooled trusts for people over
the age of 65 who receive both SSI and Medicaid.
235 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) (2000).
236 The mandatory remainder interest is perhaps more of an issue with third party pooled
trusts in which there is no mandatory payback to the State, and the remaining balance would
otherwise be distributed to beneficiaries named by the Sponsor. However, parents and other
third parties who may want to utilize these trusts can make an informed decision as to
whether the arrangement suits their needs.
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between landlords and tenants). The goal is not to completely eliminate conflicts
of interest, but we can and should institute safeguards to assure that there is no
compromise in the quality and integrity of services provided to each individual
beneficiary.
IV. THE TRIUMPH OF THE MEDICAID LIEN OVER THE SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST:
A MISTAKE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OR A FAILURE TO HARMONIZE
COMPETING PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES?
As we have seen, under OBRA '93, a person with a disability who receives a
lump sum of money can transfer the funds into an SNT and maintain eligibility for
Medicaid. However, the State must be given a priority interest in the remaining
balance of the trust upon the death of the beneficiary.237 This "bargain" strikes a
balance between the private interest of the Medicaid recipient in having a supple-
mental source of support and the public interest in recovering the costs of Medicaid
expenditures.
The benefits of OBRA '93 trusts are particularly significant for people who are
disabled as a result of personal injuries in an accident. If the injured person obtains
a settlement or verdict against the tortfeaser, the proceeds no longer have to be
"spent down" before the person can receive Medicaid. The SNT can provide
treatment, services, equipment, and therapy that are not available from Medicaid,
but extremely necessary for the person's well being. This is perhaps the paradig-
matic situation for which the OBRA '93 trust was intended.
As plaintiffs in these cases sought approval to transfer proceeds from the settle-
ment or verdict into an OBRA '93 trust, courts were faced with a dilemma: how
should the State's deferred remainder interest be reconciled with the existing fed-
eral mandate to recover Medicaid expenditures from responsible third parties?
A. Seek and Ye Shall Find: The Federal Statutory Mandate to Recover Medicaid
Costs From Responsible Third Parties
The structure and specific language of the Medicaid lien and recovery provisions
must be understood in order to analyze the relationship between a Medicaid lien
and a supplemental needs trust. As a general proposition, the federal Medicaid
statute places few limits on the means and scope of recovery against responsible
third parties. In contrast, only under sharply defined circumstances may a State
impose a lien or seek recovery directly against the property of a Medicaid recipient.
The federal statutory framework that governs Medicaid liens and recoveries in-
cludes three main components: 1) actions a State is required to take; 2) a mandate
that a person assign the right to recover against responsible third parties as a condi-
tion of receiving Medicaid; and 3) substantive provisions governing liens and re-
237 With a pooled trust, the State's remainder interest is subject to the election to retain
the remaining balance in the pooled trust. Any amounts not retained by the pooled trust
must go to the State. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000).
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coveries. In order to comply with the federal statute, a State must do the following:
1) "take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties to
pay for care and services available under the plan;" '238 2) seek reimbursement from
these third parties;239 and 3) have in effect statutes under which the State is consid-
ered to have the rights of the Medicaid recipient to payments from responsible third
parties.24" As a condition of receiving Medicaid, a person has to assign to the state
any rights she has to obtain payment for her medical treatment from a third party.24'
When a recovery is made from a responsible third party, the state is permitted to
retain the amount necessary to reimburse it for medical payments made to the indi-
vidual as a result of the injuries and then must give the remainder to the individ-
ual.242 Finally, the statute generally prohibits the imposition of a lien against the
property of a living Medicaid recipient and only allows recovery against the estate
of a person who received Medicaid from age 55 or older.243
Three key aspects of this statutory framework are central to understanding the
lien cases: 1) a lien can only be imposed against property that is owned by a re-
sponsible party (and not against the property of the Medicaid recipient); 2) the lien
must be limited to the amount necessary to reimburse Medicaid for the value of
treatment connected to the injuries suffered; and 3) the third party must be "respon-
sible" for the medical expenses of the Medicaid recipient. A State is free to de-
velop mechanisms and procedures that facilitate recovery against responsible third
parties, provided they are consistent with the federal requirements. It is within this
context that we analyze the Medicaid lien cases.
B. It's Unanimous: the Medicaid Lien Has Priority
Federal and state courts unanimously hold that the entire proceeds of a personal
injury cause of action prior to funding an OBRA '93 SNT may satisfy a Medicaid
lien. However, these decisions overlook key components of the federal statutory
framework and in doing so undermine the public policy objectives of OBRA '93
disability trusts. The decisions rely on three propositions to reach their ultimate
conclusion that the Medicaid lien trumps the SNT: 1) the proceeds of the settlement
238 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2000).
239 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (2000). The amount of reimbursement is limited to the
extent of the third party's liability for the injuries for which Medicaid was provided. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (2000).
240 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(25)(I) (2000).
241 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(l)(A) (2000); In re Estate of Calhoun, 684 N.E.2d 842 (1997).
242 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b) (2000); In re Estate of Calhoun, 684 N.E.2d 842 (1997). The
legislative history of OBRA '93 makes it clear that the scope of a responsible third party's
legal liability is limited to payment for covered services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-11, supra note 211 § 5116.
243 There are two narrow exceptions: 1) if Medicaid was incorrectly paid; and 2) against
the real property of a person who resides in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution and who is not reasonably expected to re-
turn home. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).
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or verdict are not the property of the Medicaid recipient until the lien is satisfied; 2)
the OBRA '93 trust provisions relate only to a person's eligibility for Medicaid and
do not alter the authority of the Medicaid agency to recover against responsible
third parties; and 3) the federal Medicaid statute allows the lien to be enforced
against the entire proceeds of the settlement or verdict, not only the portion allo-
cated for past medical expenses.
1. The Initial Cases Set the Stage for the Triumph of the Lien, But Reveal
Analytical Flaws
In early 1997, in Cricchio v. Pennisi and Link v. Town of Smithtown,2" the New
York Court of Appeals held that a Medicaid lien can be enforced against the pro-
ceeds of a personal injury lawsuit prior to the funding of an SNT. The plaintiffs in
these cases had severe and permanent disabilities and the amount of the settlements
greatly exceeded the Medicaid liens. The court found that a Medicaid lien does not
become the property of the Medicaid recipient until the Medicaid lien is satisfied
pursuant to a legally enforceable settlement or judgment. Because the mandatory
assignment of the right to third-party payments is a condition of Medicaid eligibil-
ity, the court reasoned that proceeds of the lawsuit are "owed" to the State by the
third-party tortfeaser.2 45 This reasoning was necessary to overcome the prohibition
against placing a lien against the property of a Medicaid recipient.
The Court in Cricchio rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the "payback" re-
quired in an OBRA '93 trust demonstrates an intent that the State defer recovery
against the responsible third party until the death of the beneficiary. The Court
stated that the trust provisions relate only to the person's eligibility for Medicaid
and are separate from the authority of a State to seek reimbursement from responsi-
ble third parties. The Court in Cricchio initially held that only the portion of the
settlement allocated for past medical expenses may be used to satisfy the lien, and
not the amount allocated to pain and suffering. The Court remanded the case for an
allocation hearing. However, the Court granted an unusual post-decision motion to
modify the language of the decision, and amended it to leave open the question
whether only the portion of the settlement allocated to past medical expenses, or
whether the entire settlement could be used to satisfy the lien.246
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals made the next significant decision in Nor-
west Bank of North Dakota, N.A. v. Doth."' This case involved two women, each
244 660 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Ct. of App. 1997). The Cricchio and Link cases were decided to-
gether.
245 Id. at 305.
246 Id. at 309-10.
247 159 F.3d 328 (8th Cir. 1998). Subsequent to Cricchio, appellate courts in North Caro-
lina and Texas each issued a decision directing that the Medicaid lien be enforced prior to
funding the trust, with minimum analysis. See Payne v. State of North Carolina Department
of Human Resources, 486 S.E. 2d 469 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (establishing a special needs
trust does not bar DMA's right to enforce its lien and DMA was entitled to the entire amount
of its lien); Texas Dep't of Health v. Buckner, 950 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (hold-
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seriously injured while passengers in an automobile accident. Sonya Lotzer suf-
fered "serious and disabling organic brain injuries" and received a settlement of
$110,000, subject to a Medicaid lien of $72,000. Bobbi Lerud received "serious
and disabling paraplegic injuries" and settled her case for $140,000, subject to a
Medicaid lien of $56,000. A court order established an OBRA '93 trust for each
woman and funded it with her settlement.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court, which held that
repayment of the liens should not be deferred. The basis of the District Court's de-
cision was that the OBRA '93 trust provisions related only to a person's eligibility
for Medicaid and did not change the State's right to recover against responsible
third parties.148 The Eighth Circuit quoted the portion of the federal assignment
statute requiring an individual, as a condition of receiving Medicaid, "[t]o assign
the State any rights, of the individual ... to payment for medical care from any
third party. ' 249 The corresponding Minnesota statute, consistent with federal law,
authorized a lien for the "[c]ost of care upon any and all causes of action which ac-
crue to the person to whom the care was furnished... as a result of the injuries
which necessitated the medical care. 252 The Court stated that deferring the Medi-
caid lien allows a person to evade an existing lien and to negate the federal statute
authorizing the lien.25'
There are several noteworthy aspects of the Norwest decision: 1) it explicitly did
not decide whether the lien could only be enforced against the portion of the set-
tlement allocated to past medical expenses; 2) it failed to acknowledge that defer-
ring the lien is consistent with the purposes of the assignment, lien, and recovery
provisions because it becomes part of a broader "payback" upon the death of the
beneficiary; and 3) it acknowledges in a footnote that the district court quoted the
wrong legislative history from the Cricchio case.
To understand why the "legislative history" footnote is important, one must re-
visit the Cricchio case. The Cricchio court justified its holding by reasoning that
the settlement was not the property of the Medicaid recipient and that the OBRA
'93 trust provisions related only to eligibility, not to reimbursement. To support
this analysis, the Court drew on the legislative history of New York's supplemental
needs trust statute, which states that its purpose was to "[e]ncourage families to un-
dertake long-term financial planning for loved-ones with family assets that were
ing the entire cause of action available to satisfy lien, relying on federal assignment statute
and state statute that defined third party resources as including payment made to a Medicaid
recipient "[f]or injuries requiring Medicaid services including payments for mental anguish,
pain and suffering, and future medical expenses when the inury causing the need for Medi-
caid services was the basis for those claims or payments").
248 Id. at 330.
249 Id. at 332 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(I)(A) (2000)).
250 Id. at 332 (citing MN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0423). Interestingly, the Minnesota stat-
ute requires that the Medicaid recipient must receive at least one-third of the net recovery
after attorney fees and other costs. Id.
251 Id. at 333.
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not otherwise earmarked to reimburse government assistance." '252
Ironically, this legislative history was written prior to OBRA '93 and had noth-
ing to do with OBRA '93. At that time, the statute only authorized third-party sup-
plemental needs trusts established and funded by assets of family members who
had no legal duty to support the disabled beneficiary. There was no statute on ei-
ther the federal or state level that authorized a trust funded with the property of the
disabled Medicaid recipient. This would not occur until the passage of OBRA '93
on approximately August 10, 1993.
The Eighth Circuit in Norwest dismissed the error, saying the analysis of the
district court was "nevertheless sound." However, the failure of these courts to
recognize this analytical error suggests a lack of understanding about OBRA '93
trusts and their relationship to Medicaid liens and recoveries. Other courts have
since made this mistake.
2. The Cases Continue: The Right to Enforce the Medicaid Lien is Paramount,
but Questions Remain
S.S. v. State of Utah,253 involved a minor who suffered brain damage and was
permanently disabled in an accident with a drunk driver. He received a settlement
of $175,000 and the amount of the Medicaid lien was $44,454.58. The Utah Su-
preme Court stated that the distinction between reimbursement (the Medicaid re-
covery statutes) and eligibility (the OBRA '93 trusts) allowed it to "[c]onclude,
without doing violence to either statute, that recoveries from third parties liable for
the same expenses covered by Medicaid belong to the State, but any remaining bal-
ance not owed to the State may be used to fund a properly structured supplemental
needs trust." '254 The court correctly noted that the trust gives the beneficiary the
benefit of a greater amount of resources than normally allowed under the Medicaid
resource rules.2"' On its face, that conclusion seems reasonable.
However, the court reveals its flawed legal reasoning and failure to truly under-
stand the relationship among the statutes and public policies by its use of a quote
from the Cricchio case to support its conclusion: "[T]here is no indication that the
amendments were designed to alter the legal liability of any responsible third party
to reimburse Medicaid for care, which is a cornerstone of the Medicaid program.
Rather, the legislative history of the Acts authorizing the creation and favorable
treatment of assets held in an SNT reveals that the sole desire to encourage families
to undertake long-term financial planning for loved-ones with family assets that
were not otherwise earmarked to reimburse government assistance prompted the
amendments."2"6
On the same day of the S.S. decision, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case
252 Cricchio, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 683 (quoting Bill Jacket, L. 1993, c. 433 Mem. In Support).
253 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998).
254 Id. at 443.
255 Id.
256 Id. (citing Cricchio, 683 N.E.2d at 305).
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of Wallace v. Estate of Jackson.5 7 Sixteen-year-old Daniel McNeil suffered severe
and permanent brain injuries resulting in "profound neurological deficits" after an
automobile accident. 258 The insurance proceeds could not satisfy the claims of all
the injured or deceased parties. As part of the settlement, Daniel received a total of
$85,000. The State of Utah made a claim directly against Daniel, but not against
the insurer. The lower court ordered that the State be paid $43,000 from Daniel's
settlement as reimbursement for the amount of Medicaid expended for Daniel, and
the remainder be used to fund a "special needs trust."
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Daniel's claim that a state statute authorizing
liens against "proceeds payable to the recipient by a third party" violated a federal
statute prohibiting direct liens against the property of a Medicaid recipient.2"9 As-
sociate Chief Justice Durham dissented in both cases, excoriating the reasoning of
the majority. In the S.S. case, the dissent argued that the OBRA '93 provisions
were explicit exceptions to the general "collection scheme. '26" Additionally, Jus-
tice Durham pointed to the structure of the federal statute to demonstrate the lack of
distinction between eligibility provisions (i.e., the trust) and reimbursement (the
general recovery framework). In particular, the OBRA '93 trusts are part of a sec-
tion that includes provisions concerning liens, recoveries of correctly paid assis-
tance, transfers of assets, trusts, and definitions. The section protects certain prop-
erty from liens and recoveries during the lifetime of Medicaid recipients, including
people with disabilities. Perhaps the most persuasive point made by Justice Dur-
ham is that the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p includes the proceeds of a
lawsuit.16 1 Justice Durham concludes that supplemental needs trusts are "intended
to be an explicit, specific, and narrow exception [to the general recovery scheme]
available to persons who are totally disabled-the extraordinary case. 262
In the Wallace case, Justice Durham used the procedural posture of the case to
demonstrate that the lien was actually being enforced against the property of the
Medicaid recipient, in violation of the federal statute. The State did not exercise its
right to pursue the tortfeaser independently or to intervene in the case. Instead, it
interposed a cross-claim directly against Daniel McNeil for reimbursement. Justice
Durham argues that Congress intended the State to pursue responsible third parties
directly, either by an independent action or by intervening in the lawsuit prior to a
settlement or verdict.
2 63
257 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998).
258 Id. at 447.
259 id.
260 S.S. v. Utah, 972 P.2d at 444.
261 Id. at 444-45 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)). Justice Durham also cited portions of
the Utah statute governing trusts to illustrate that it encompasses both eligibility and reim-
bursement issues.
262 Id. at 445.
263 See Wallace, 972 P.2d 446. Justice Durham points out that the Utah statue allows, in
violation of the federal statute, a lien directly against the Medicaid recipient. In addition, a
June 5, 1996 memorandum from the Health Care Finance Administration states that a poten-
tial personal injury settlement is subject to a lien, and to avoid the "lien issue" suggests that a
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Justice Durham's dissents contain some of the most cogent and powerful argu-
ments against allowing enforcement of a Medicaid lien prior to the funding of the
SNT. It is difficult to argue that the property of a Medicaid recipient is not subject
to a lien on a settlement, particularly when the statutory definition of assets in-
cludes the proceeds of a settlement to which a person is entitled. Nevertheless, the
majority prevailed by relying on Cricchio and a selective reading of the federal law.
Although the Utah cases did not explicitly discuss the medical expense issue, it
soon appeared in the next cluster of cases that ended the controversy.
3. The Final Answer: The Medicaid Lien Can Be Satisfied Against the Entire
Proceeds of a Personal Injury Lawsuit
The final unresolved issue was the scope of the Medicaid lien: is it only en-
forceable against the portion of a settlement or award allocated for past medical ex-
penses, or against the entire proceeds of the lawsuit? An appellate court in New
Jersey addressed the issue first. In Waldman v. Candia,264 the Superior Court une-
quivocally held it is not necessary to determine the liability of a tortfeaser. The
court stated that to hold otherwise would be "[t]o elevate form over substance. Pat-
ently, the settlements in both of these matters eventuated from claims of injury for
the treatment of which Medicaid funds had been expended." '265 The Waldman court
also cited the decisions of the Eighth Circuit and the District Court in the Norwest
case with approval. The court agreed with the Norwest District Court that
"[I]nterpreting the SNT provision as shielding recoveries in tort actions from a
state's recovery action would tend to render the state's right of recovery meaning-
less." '266 This is a flaw in the reasoning of Waldman and Norwest. The payback re-
quirement in the SNT protects the interest of the State and its lien, therefore, the
state's right of recovery would be meaningful even if only past medical expenses
were subject to the lien prior to the funding of the trust.
In Calvanese v. Calvanese267 the New York Court of Appeals finally addressed
the medical expense issue. The court held that Medicaid liens can be enforced
against a settlement, without regard to any allocation made between pain and suf-
fering and past medical expenses. As in Cricchio, the Court endorsed New York's
assignment, subrogation, and lien provisions as appropriate means to comply with
the federal subrogation requirement.268 The Court rejected arguments limiting the
State could intervene directly to protect its interests; the memo does not include the option to
impose a lien after liability is established. Justice Durham also cites 42 C.F.R. §
433.140(f)(1) (must seek reimbursement from a liable third party when recovery will exceed
costs) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(p)(15% rebate of money recovered as incentive). Durham as-
serts that when a state imposes a lien against the Medicaid recipient, it is getting a free ride
and a windfall.
264 722 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
265 Id. at 586.
266 Id.
267 710 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1999).
268 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. 433.146(c); N.Y. Soc. SERV. Law
§ 366-4(h)(1); § 360-7.4(a)(6).
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scope of the Department's right to reimbursement from third parties on the grounds
that it weakens the role of Medicaid as the payor of last resort.269 The court noted
that limiting the right of recovery creates an "anomalous situation in which Medi-
caid applicants could be disqualified from eligibility for financial resources that in-
clude prior personal injury settlements allocated to pain and suffering, but Medi-
caid recipients could shield such funds from recoupment by the Department after
having received significant public assistance."270
In reality, this "anomalous situation" would not exist. A Medicaid applicant
would not be disqualified because of a personal injury settlement allocated solely
for pain and suffering if the applicant transferred the funds into a supplemental
needs trust as permitted by law.
C. Concluding Thoughts on Medicaid Liens and OBRA '93 Trusts
The trust provisions for people with disabilities enacted under the OBRA '93
added a new layer of public policy to the Medicaid provisions of the Social Secu-
rity Act. A disabled person who receives a lump sum of money from any source is
allowed to utilize a trust to provide a better quality of life than is available by sub-
sisting on SSI and Medicaid. In return, Medicaid receives a new, enlarged right of
recovery upon the person's death.
Courts should have rejected the position that immediate satisfaction of Medicaid
liens from legally responsible third parties is mandated prior to the trust's fund-
ing.27" ' The federal mandate to seek recovery is satisfied even if recovery on the
lien is deferred until the death of the beneficiary. In reality, when a trust is estab-
lished for, and funded with the assets of, a disabled person under the age of 65, the
State receives a greatly expanded right of recovery.272 Pursuant to the clear lan-
guage of the federal statute and regulations, the third party is only "responsible" if
it has a legal liability to pay for medical expenses already covered by Medicaid.
Courts fail to recognize that Medicaid should only be entitled to recover from the
portion of the settlement or verdict intended for past medical expenses.
A court's failure to allocate the proceeds of a settlement or verdict should not
hurt the plaintiff who devoted the time, energy, and money to bring the lawsuit.
Under federal law, a Medicaid agency has two options: to proceed directly against
269 See id.; see also Seeman v. Iowa Dep't of Human Serv., 604 N.W.2d 53 (1999) (up-
holding subrogation rights of the Department as equitable).
270 Calvanese, supra note 267, at 1082.
271 See, e.g., Costello on behalf of Stark v. Geiser, 647 N.E.2d 1261 (N.Y. 1995) (up-
holding a limitation on the extent of the State's right of recovery of medical expenses against
a father who was a responsible third party).
272 The State's right of recovery from the remainder of an OBRA '93 trust should be
viewed as an additional tool that enhances the State's recovery arsenal. This remainder in-
terest is broader than the right of estate recovery, which is limited to individuals who re-
ceived Medicaid over the age of 55, and may not include property passing outside a person's
will or under a state's laws of intestacy. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).
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the responsible third party or to make a claim on the proceeds of the lawsuit."3
This unique model maximizes the benefits available to the disabled person dur-
ing his lifetime and protects and expands the State's right of recovery. The OBRA
'93 individual trust is consistent with two primary objectives of Medicaid: to
maintain the health of recipients and to maximize the recovery of benefits to the
largest extent possible.
V. THE POLICY RATIONALE OF SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS AND PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM
The law governing SNTs developed significantly during the latter part of the
twentieth century. Indeed, one could make the case that most of the major legal
obstacles to using an SNT have been addressed satisfactorily. However, the status
of SNTs is never secure. They are continually vulnerable to budget-cutting efforts
by state legislatures, Congress, and judges viewing SNTs as antithetical to public
policy.274
The nature and perception of disability is complex. It is increasingly difficult to
identify people with disabilities severe enough to justify special protection because
disability is relative. Disabilities include visible physical conditions and an array of
mental and psychosocial aspects that are not visible, not universally accepted, and
subject to multiple definitions and categories.275 Proposals to expand eligibility or
services offered by government programs raise concerns about diminishing infor-
mal support networks and raise concerns that additional people will emerge "out of
the woodwork" to take advantage of the services.276 There is also a fundamental
tension between the presumption of need on which eligibility for benefits is based
and the quest for services that support independent living in the community.2 7 7 If
community services will not lead to employment, they are considered a luxury that
will not be offset by productive work; to the extent that the potential for employ-
ment exists, the rationale for income support and health insurance is challenged.2 71
The value society places on productive employment makes the justification of re-
273 In Cole v. State Dept. of Transportation & Development, 755 So. 2d 315 (La. Ct. App.
1999), a Louisiana court of appeal refused to allow the Medicaid agency to recover past
medical expenses against a tortfeaser where the agency failed to intervene in the lawsuit.
274 See Lang v. Commonwealth, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987) (Larsen, J. dissenting).
275 VLADECK ET AL., supra note 21, at 87. The elimination of alcoholism and drug addic-
tion as qualifying conditions for SSI, the termination of benefits for thousands of recipients
that disproportionately affected people with mental illness, and the public perception in the
aftermath of the Sullivan v. Zebley case that children who were not really disabled received
benefits demonstrates the public ambivalence toward certain groups of disabled people. Id.
276 Id. at 88 (offering the example of personal care services contained in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which was subsequently repealed under pressure by the
states fearing that new costs would be greater than any savings achieved through greater use





habilitation and treatment services that will not result in a return to work more dif-
ficult.279 This ambivalence may be due to the low (3%) number of people who are
able to work after rehabilitation.280
A. The Critique of SNTs and a Response
The obvious critique of SNTs is that they allow people with private resources to
utilize the SSI and Medicaid programs at the expense of people who are truly indi-
gent. From the left, SNTs may be perceived as devices allowing the middle class
and wealthy to access government benefits intended only for the indigent. From
the right, SNTs offend the individualistic story of self-reliance and independence
that is part of our heritage. Both critiques are based in large part on the dichotomy
between "welfare" and "social insurance" that was at the heart of the New Deal.2 1
In the United States, the two major categories of programs are "social insurance"
and "welfare." The major federal social insurance programs include Social Secu-
rity Retirement, Survivor, and Disability Insurance benefits and Medicare.28 2 These
benefits are available to workers, their dependents and survivors without regard to
279 Id. at 86.
280 Id. 69% of disabled adults of working age are unemployed and 28% of people with
disabilities live below the poverty line, compared with 11% of the general population.
VACHON, supra note 29, at 118-119.
281 The New Deal legislation preferred a social insurance model to welfare programs.
However, welfare programs remained because of a number of factors: 1) unemployment and
under-employment persisted and therefore a substantial number of people failed to qualify
for the employment record based social security benefits; 2) the U.S. failed to enact any form
of universal medical insurance; 3) the demographic shift of the welfare population from
widows and children (who would qualify for Social Security Survivor's Insurance) to fami-
lies headed by divorced or never married women; and 4) the inadequacy of non-Social Secu-
rity Income from workers' compensation, pension, savings, and part-time work, causing
many elderly and disabled people to be poor enough to qualify for means tested programs.
The size of the major programs of social insurance-the various social security programs
and Medicare-dwarfs the expenditures of welfare, SSI, Medicaid, and food stamps. A
large percentage of Americans receive income support and medical insurance as retirees,
people with disabilities, and survivors of insured workers. THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL.,
AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 79 (1990). Social Security and Medicare ac-
counted for approximately 35% of federal expenditures in 1999. Comm. on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 2000 Green Book 1335 (2000). In contrast, Medi-
caid and the other means-tested programs comprised only about 10% of the federal budget in
1999. Id.
282 The goals of a system of social insurance are to promote economic security and pre-
vent destitution. Its primary design is not to rescue those who have fallen. The goal is to
"universalize" financial security against the threats of involuntary unemployment, widow-
hood, sickness, injury, retirement and large families. MARMOR, supra note 281, at 95. Al-
though the public's misperception about the fiscal impact of welfare programs to the non-
disabled poor may have contributed to the political momentum behind welfare reform, the
perception that the programs fostered family disintegration and dependency made it a potent
symbol of what was wrong with social welfare policy.
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financial need. The cluster of welfare or "means-tested" programs include: cash
benefits under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996;283 Supplemental Security Income for the aged, blind and disabled;
28 4
Food Stamps;2 .and Medicaid. 86 These programs are often perceived as taxpayer-
financed handouts to people seen as defective or decrepit because of poor character,
physical or mental disability, or old age.
A closer look at these programs pierces the myth of this distinction. For exam-
ple, most Social Security and Medicare recipients receive more in benefits than
their FICA contributions generated. Current workers pay the benefits for current
retirees, just as current taxes pay the benefits of current welfare recipients. There-
fore, like welfare recipients, beneficiaries of social security retirement are "on the
dole."
The myth of the earned entitlement has great political and ideological power.
The social insurance programs have a broad constituency, compared to welfare
programs that focus on the most marginalized and powerless in society (a small
percentage of whom actually vote). Ironically, welfare for working age adults en-
genders the greatest controversy and discontent despite its relatively minimal ex-
penditures.2"7
One response to the SNT critique is that Medicaid already opened the "flood-
gates" to the middle class through its transfer of assets rules, resource exemptions,
and loopholes in estate recovery requirements. Categorical and financial eligibility
criteria means tests are designed to exclude people who are "undeserving" because
they neither fit into the acceptable personal categories nor do they meet the poverty
tests. 288 The categorical tests for SSI and Medicaid require a person to be "dis-
abled" '289 or over the age of 65.290 The financial eligibility criteria require a Medi-
caid applicant or recipient to meet strict income and resource limits."' The SSI and
Medicaid programs mitigate the harshness of these rules through resource "exemp-
tions" disregarding the value of a primary residence, automobile, and other neces-
sary personal property. Moreover, individual programs have incorporated addi-
283 Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (2000)).
284 The SSI program is somewhat of a hybrid because it is part of the Social Security Act
and of a federal entitlement program. Because it is limited to the elderly and disabled-the
"deserving poor"--it does not have the stigma often associated with welfare benefits for the
able-bodied poor.
285 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.
286 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a et seq.
287 See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1277, 1315-25 (1993).
288 Means-tested programs, primarily Supplemental Security Income, TANF, and Medi-
caid each have complex eligibility rules that define the kind and amount of income and as-
sets a person can have and retain eligibility.
289 See supra note 224.
290 Medicaid is also available to certain families, children, pregnant women, and single
adults who meet the applicable eligibility requirements. See HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN




tional "special" exemptions designed to achieve a targeted purpose.292
Politically, Medicaid enjoys wider support precisely because a broad cross-
section of recipients utilizes the program. A program that benefits only the work-
ing age poor, such as AFDC, was so politically vulnerable that it was abolished in
1996, ending six decades of federal social policy that guaranteed a minimum level
of assistance. Medicaid retained its status as an entitlement program despite efforts
to make it a block grant program." 3
B. The Rationale for SNTs: Mitigating the Impact of Disability and the
Inadequacy of Government Benefits
Social welfare policy and government benefits are designed to help people who
cannot fully support themselves and their families through employment due to age,
illness, disability, or inability to obtain work. Medicare and Medicaid are often the
primary sources of health insurance for the disabled. These programs reflect the
traditional, prevailing emphasis on acute inpatient hospital services and post-
hospital care 294 and do not provide adequate mental health services, community
based services, or access to assistive technology.
295
The ability to supplement the basic level of support provided by government
benefits may enable the beneficiary to reside longer in the community, require less
acute medical care, and ultimately reduce the need for the state to provide costly
hospital and institutional care. For example, the SNT can provide the beneficiary
292 For example, the Medicaid program permits the "community" spouse of a person liv-
ing in a nursing home enhanced income and resource allowances. The income and assets of
the institutionalized spouse are used to the extent that the "community spouse" does not have
sufficient income or assets individually. The Medicaid transfer rules provide opportunities
for people to preserve assets and limit the duration of any "penalty periods" of ineligibility.
The TANF program gives states the option to allow recipients to keep earned income within
certain limits so that employment does not result in a loss of benefits and services. SSI's
PASS program allows recipients to put aside earnings in a special account in order to
achieve self-support. It is noteworthy that in an era of cutting benefits and increasingly dif-
ficult qualification standards, these targeted funds, including supplemental needs trusts, have
been strengthened. Together they reflect a social welfare policy that implicitly recognizes
that achieving goals of employment or independent living requires flexible eligibility stan-
dards.
293 President Clinton initially vetoed two versions of the proposed welfare reform bill be-
cause it made Medicaid a block grant program. George J. Church, Ripping Up Welfare With
Not a Little Drama, Clinton Grudgingly Approves the G.O.P. Bill, and the U.S. Starts a Vast
and Risky Experiment, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 18, available in 1996 WL
10668485.
294 Medicare is the paradigmatic example of a program that was originally designed to
meet the health care needs of the elderly as they were perceived in 1965 and created a sys-
tem of coverage that was oriented to the treatment of acute illnesses. Thirty-five years later,
Medicare fails to meet the exploding need for prescription drugs outside the hospital setting,
home care, and nursing home care.
295 VLADECK ET AL., supra note 21, at 83.
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with access to assistive technology and technology in general. Technology has
"[d]ramatically changed the potential of people with disabilities, and American so-
cial values of equity and fairness have brought about changes in law in relation to
people with disabilities ...""'
The replacement of the institutional model with community-based treatment for
people with disabilities ushered in a new era of social welfare policy. Prior to the
community-based model, institutions that defined the scope of care and the state's
responsibility provided treatment for people with disabilities, particularly those
with cognitive impairments.297 The "Willowbrook" case29 greatly increased public
awareness of the inhumane conditions inside these institutions. 299 Numerous law-
suits forged legal protection intended to provide habilitation services in the least
restrictive setting.300 In 1999, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right
to receive services in the community under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
30 1
The needs of people with disabilities in the community are very different than in
an institutional setting. These needs vary according to the particular residential
setting and the functional impact of the disability. A variety of residential settings
have replaced the large institutional setting for people with developmental disabili-
ties and mental retardation. Group homes offer opportunities for independent liv-
ing in the community with appropriate supervision levels. The SNT supports inde-
pendent living in the community for people whose disabilities render them unable
to fully support themselves through employment.
C. Proposals for SNT Reform
The goal of these reforms is to enable SNTs to achieve their full potential to en-
hance the quality of life for people with disabilities. This often conflicts with the
interests of the State in preserving the public purse and limiting government benefit
expenditures.
296 DISABILITY: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE, HEALTH CARE FINANCING & LABOR
MARKET POLICY 2 (Virginia P. Reno et al. eds., 1997). This report was produced by the Na-
tional Academy of Social Insurance and focused on the relationship between work incentives
and Social Security disability benefits. The report found that in 1991, the U.S. spent 0.7% of
the gross national product on disability benefits, less than the United Kingdom 1.9%, Ger-
many 2.0%, and Sweden 3.3%, countries that emphasize rehabilitation and employment. Id.
The report also concluded that lack of health care coverage-or more precisely, the fear of
losing Medicare or Medicaid-is more of a "structural impediment" to work than income
sugoort. Id. at 3.
7 VLADECK ET AL., supra note 21, at 90.
298 New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (approving consent judgment).
299 See, e.g., DAVID J. ROT-MAN, TtE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984).
300 VLADEK ET AL., supra note 21, at 91.
301 Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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1. Establish Superceding Rules of Construction
The continuing litigation that parses the language of third-party trusts and strains
to discern the creator's intent is, in reality, a court's judgment about what a state's
public policy with respect to trusts should be. Establishing clear rules of construc-
tion that presume a trust is not an available asset would eliminate harmful litiga-
tion. If the beneficiary receives SSI or Medicaid, the starting point should be the
existing criteria in the SSI Program Operations Systems Manual." 2 If the trust con-
formed to those criteria, it should not be considered an available asset. If the trus-
tee has any degree of discretion, there should be a presumption that the trust sup-
plements government benefits, rather than replaces them. Absent a clear
expression of intent that the trust should be used to replace government benefits,
the trust should not be considered an available asset for purposes of eligibility for
government benefits.
2. Recommendations to Improve OBRA '93 Trusts
a. Expand the Class of People Allowed to Establish an OBRA '93 Trust.
Under current law only a parent, grandparent, legal guardian, or court can estab-
lish an individual payback trust for a disabled beneficiary under the age of 65. In
the case of a pooled trust, the disabled beneficiary can also establish the trust ac-
count.
A disabled individual should be allowed to establish an individual trust. This
would recognize that the protections of OBRA '93 includes people with physical
disabilities who are not cognitively impaired. It also would acknowledge that not
every person with a cognitive disability or mental illness lacks the capacity to es-
tablish a trust.
In addition, a sibling, spouse, or significant other who qualifies as a domestic
partner, or the executive director of a not-for-profit corporation that provides serv-
ices to the person with a disability should be authorized to establish an individual
trust or a pooled trust account. This would enable trusts to be established for a
greater number of beneficiaries without a court order or the appointment of a
guardian.
b. Eliminate the Age Limit for Individual OBRA '93 Trusts.
Congress' intent to close Medicaid loopholes available to the elderly resulted in
the under-65 age limit for individual trusts. Eliminating the age limitation would
not create opportunities for abuse of Medicaid by the affluent elderly for two rea-
sons. First, the mandatory payback to the State prevents a person from sheltering
assets for the purpose of passing it on to family members. Second, eliminating the
302 See source cited supra notes 169, 172 and accompanying text.
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age limit makes OBRA '93 trusts available to people with disabilities over 65 who
either do not live in an area served by a pooled trust, or who do not trust an organi-
zation to manage their money. The State benefits from the use of individual trusts
in that the State will receive a mandatory payback. If the only option for a disabled
person over the age of 65 is a pooled trust, the remainder may be retained by the
pooled trust, and the State would receive nothing upon the death of the beneficiary
who funded the trust.
c. Defer Medicaid Liens until the Beneficiary's Death
In a personal injury case, Medicaid lien enforcement until the beneficiary's death
if the proceeds are being transferred into an OBRA '93 supplemental needs trust.
An allocation for past medical expenses should be subject to the Medicaid lien, but
only to the extent it doesn't exceed ten percent of the settlement or judgment. A
Medicaid recipient should not be able to configure the settlement to avoid satisfy-
ing the lien by not claiming past medical expenses. Furthermore, assuming the
Medicaid agency does not exercise its right to proceed independently against the
defendants who are the responsible parties, the agency should have the burden of
intervening in the case early enough to protect its interest. If the agency is pro-
vided with notice of the lawsuit and no allocation for past medical expenses is
made, the Medicaid lien should be incorporated into the State's remainder interest
in the trust.
Regulations can help to reasonably assure that the Medicaid lien will be satisfied
upon the death of the beneficiary.0 3 In addition, the trustee has an inherent obliga-
tion to balance its duty to the life beneficiary and those parties with an interest in
the remainder.
D. Replicate and Expand the Concept of Supplemental Needs Trusts
In the SSI program, exemptions for supplemental needs trusts304 and the Plan for
Achieving Self Support ("PASS") program 5 allow "special" accounts for the pur-
pose of improving the recipient's quality of life. Medicaid grants enhanced income
and resource allowances to a "community spouse" living at home whose spouse
reside in a nursing home.30 6 These allowances break the cycle of impoverishment
that occurs when a spouse can no longer receive proper care at home. Supplemen-
tal needs trusts can also provide important benefits to Medicaid recipients. 7
303 The State of New York Department of Social Services promulgated regulations that
require notification of the creation and funding of the trust, distributions for less than fair
market value, distributions that substantially deplete the trust, and the death of the benefici-
ary. N.Y. CODES R. & REGs. TIT. 118 § 360-4.5(1)(5)(11I).
304 42 U.S.C. § 1382b; see also supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
303 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1180-.1182 (1996).
306 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (1996).
307 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) & (C) (2000). For a discussion of third-party trusts cre-
ated for a Medicaid beneficiary, see infra Part III.A.3.
[Vol. 10
SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS
Even in "welfare" programs under Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
block grants, states are required to allow welfare recipients with dependent children
to maintain their benefits despite increased earnings."' States also have the option
to eliminate resource limits for pregnant women and children applying for Medi-
caid.3" Finally, a state is permitted to use a portion of its TANF block grant to
fund "individual development accounts" that will allow recipients to save earned
income and use it for post-secondary educational expenses, for the purchase of a
first home, or to capitalize a business." °
These developments may potentially narrow the gap between means-tested pro-
grams and social insurance. Recipients of means-tested programs are allowed to
maintain additional income and resources, establish special accounts for specific
purposes, or enjoy the benefit of assets that are placed in certain forms of trusts.
These allowances and exemptions mitigate the limitations, inadequacies, and gaps
of these benefit programs and provide a supplemental source of funds that can be
used for "beneficiary-centered" treatment, care, and services.3 ' Therefore, sup-
plemental needs trusts, or similar "dedicated" resource accounts, improve people's
lives and complement the benefits available from means-tested government benefit
programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supplemental needs trusts play an important role in enhancing the quality of life
for people with disabilities who are unable to cure their poverty through employ-
ment. Pooled supplemental needs trusts provide opportunities for nonprofit groups
to expand the scope .of their services for the benefit of a greater number of people.
Supplemental needs trusts create opportunities for independent living, innovative
rehabilitation and therapy, employment, and other activities that give life meaning.
The concept of the supplemental needs trust should be strengthened, replicated, and
expanded.
30' See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-a(8)(a)(iii) (McKinney 2000) (excluding a per-
centage of earned income, but imposing a limit on eligibility if income exceeds the applica-
ble poverty level).
309 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1996). See also, HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 290,
at 219 n.34.
310 HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 288, at 39 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat.
2105, § 103 (1996)).
311 VLADEK ET AL., supra note 21, at 100.
20001
